Zapomniana bitwa epoki napoleońskiej

  • Marcin Baranowski Wydział Nauk Humanistycznych, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II w Lublinie
Słowa kluczowe: wojny napoleońskie; odwrót spod Moskwy; wojna 1812-1813; Kalisz

Abstrakt

In the beginning of December 1812 the situation of the Napoleonic army retreating from Russia was very difficult. The multinational Grand Army, exhausted by a long campaign, was only a wreck of the army that in the summer had marched to Moscow. In view of the alarming messages from Paris, on 5th December Napoleon decided to leave his soldiers and go back to France. His marshals were ordered to continue delaying actions which were designed to spare time for the emperor to arrive in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw with the fresh forces. A special role in those actions was given to Major-General Count Jean Reynier, the commander of the 7th Saxon corps.

In view of the betrayal by the Prussian and Austrian contingents assisting the Grand Army, the Saxon corps were the last unit that could provide support for the 5th Polish corps of Prince Poniatowski organised near Piotrków. For this reason, it was especially important for Reynier's soldiers to maintain their position near Kalisz, where the two corps were supposed to combine in the middle of February 1813. Moreover, keeping Kalisz in the Napoleonic hands closed the tsarist soldiers a way back to Prussian Silesia. This had an additional value, if one takes into account the indecisive attitude of Frederick Wilhelm III.

The attack on Kalisz was supposed to be carried out by the Russian corps of avant-garde commanded by General-Lieutenant Baron Ferdinand von Wintzingerode. Despite the fact that Wintzingerode outnumbered the Grand Army a little (ca. 14.000 Russians to ca. 12.000 soldiers of the Grand Army), the tsarist army managed to defeat its enemy twice in Turek and Stawiszyn (12th February), and then unexpectedly appear near Kalisz on 13th February in the morning. The Saxcon troops located northwards from the town were completely taken aback and surrounded by the numerous Russian cavalry. The brigade commanded by General von Nostitz was defeated in the battles of Kokanin and Borków, and Pawłówek and Skarszew were attacked, with the brigades of General von Steindel and Colonel Maura. These units managed to escape, unlike the defenders of Borków, but were forced to leave their positions and retreat to the other bank of the Prosna. The decisive battle took place in late afternoon in the Kalisz suburbs, near the village Tyniec. Despite the ever recurring attack of the Russian troops commanded by Prince Wirtemberski, General Jarry's French brigade, supported by the Polish 2nd regiment of troops and the Saxon brigade under General von Sahr, managed to keep their position and defend the bridge on the Prosna.

The general balance of battles, however, was adverse for the 7th corps. They lost ca. 1.500 soldiers (in comparison to 600 Russians). In the night of 13/14 February the Napoleonic armies retreated from Kalisz. Thereby the main Russian goals had been accomplished – the 7th corps were considerably weakened, the route to Silesia was opened, whereas Prince Poniatowski's Poles were cut from the remaining units of the Grand Army.

Bibliografia

Clement G.: Campagne de 1813, Paris 1905.

Gembarzewski B.: Wojsko Polskie. Księstwo Warszawskie 1807-1814, Warszawa 1905.

Kukiel M.: Dzieje oręża polskiego w epoce napoleońskiej 1795-1815, Poznań 1912.

Łukasiewicz M.: Armia Księcia Józefa 1813, Warszawa 1986.

Olczak M.: Kampania 1813. Śląsk i Łużyce, Warszawa 2004.

Staszewski J.: Kaliski wysiłek zbrojny 1806-1813, Kalisz 1931.

Opublikowane
2019-10-02
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