Λόγος in Epicharmus' Fragments

Abstract

The paper seeks to examine the semantic-philosophical dimension of the word λόγος in Epicharmus' fragments, the Sicilian poet, who owing to his philosophical interests is often rated among the pre-Socratics. In our analyses here, we deal with seven „in a measure” authentic fragments (9 K = Kaibel; 87-89 tit. 1/K; 254 K = B 6 DK = Diels-Kranz; 295 K = B 65 DK; 279 K; 278 K = B 39 DK; 170 K = B 1 + B 2 DK) and one pseudo-Epicharmean text by Chrysogonos (B 57 DK = 255-257 K). Their careful reading (taking into account, as far as it is possible, a broad context), allow us to draw several conclusions. It should be noted, above all, that in Epicharmus' texts the „rational” aspect of the word λόγος is dominating. Such meanings as „reason, consciousness, intellect” testify to it. It is, therefore, human cognitive faculty, assessment of facts (e.g. under the angle of their possible use for man − see frag. 9 K: λόγος γινώσκων) and drawing proper conclusions (by means of analogy and induction) about the universal character of a continuous change, both in inanimate and animate reality (the animate reality is represented by man who changes everyday − see frag. 170 K = B 2 DK). The „rationality” of Logos is proved by its other uses. Here we should quote the title of the play Λόγος καὶ Λογίνα, that is a personification of both concepts: He-Word and She-Word. According to us, this title should rather be understood as male (i.e. correct) „Argument” and woman's (= female, i.e. naive and unwise) „Argumentation,” therefore there are antagonistic figures who conduct a „dialectic” argument and reason in two ways: a better one − man, and a worse one − woman (such reflection seems to be justified by fragment 87 K, taken probably from this play). The „arguments” (οἱ ἐμοὶ λόγοι οὗτοι − frag. 254 K = B 6 DK) have an equally rhetorical overtone. They are skillfully (resp. wisely) constructed and flow from the mouth of the mythic Palamedes, a probable subject of the statement. Aside to its rational character, Epicharmus' Logos retains also its traditionally „expressive” (in other words, enunciative) form as a „beautiful word” in the form of „artistic prose” or „regular poetry,” i.e. rhythmic (λόγοι καλοί + τὸ μέτρον − frag. 254 K = B 6 DK). A similar meaning should be found in the „sweet words” (λόγοι ἅδυμοι − frag. 279 K), obviously pertaining to an „elaborate speech,” or else to a „neat and clever argumentation.” There is another title in which we are interested here, entitled „An Address to Antenor” (Λόγος πρὸς ᾽Αντήνορα − frag. 295 K), although due to Epicharmus' interests in philosophy and science the sense of such a title may equally well point to the „Treatise Dedicated to Antenor.” Eventually, we find an „expressive” case of the word λόγος used in a gnomic fragment 278 K (= B 39 DK), in which the literally taken „words,” speaking more precisely „verbal (i.e. empty) boasts,” turn out to be only „false empty promises” (resp. they are falsehoods) in comparison with the genuine reality of an „act,” a reality which is at the same time (at least according to an average man) available for the senses. The opposition „word” ↔ „act” (λόγος ↔ ἔργον) thus becomes a universal (i.e. commonly used in everyday language) statement of ontological incompatibility between the uttered „word” (τῷ λόγῳ) and its actual embodiment in the form of a concrete action and its result (τῷ ἔργῳ). Consequently, the comparison of these concepts may be considered simultaneously at two levels: epistemological and ethical, as a confrontation of „false” (= pretence, illusion) and „truth” (identical with the real, physical reality). Especially important among the fragments under consideration here is the pseudo-Epicharmean fragment B 57 DK (= 256-257 K). It has been included into our considerations, among other things, due to its authorship ascribed to Epicharmus. In this fragment we deal with the Heraclitean doctrine about Logos; for the „divine Reason” (ϑεῖος λόγος) under discussion here, identified with „God” himself (ὁ ϑεός), is the highest power governing human fortunes, the only source of human reason, and the only discoverer and teacher of any utilitarian arts.

Epicharmus himself might have come to the same conclusions, since we find with him some other traces of the doctrine of Heraclitus, if only an express note about the doctrine of the permanent variability of the world (we find its plastic representation in frag. 170 K). Epicharmus' original testimonies, and also those which were ascribed to him (especially frag. B 57 DK), confirm that there is in Heraclitus' thought not only the theory of variability, but also the idea of Logos, a power governing the river-like variable universe. We do not know, however, to what extent such references to the thought of the Ephesian resulted merely from a willingness to make its „dramatic” (= „comic”) travesty (as in the case of the mythological themes and figures) or compete with the philosopher himself; or, to what extent they were attempts to penetrate into the sense of its exceptionally thought. We shall never know the truth. From our point of view, the most essential thing is that such testimonies exist. Owing to them our knowledge about the philosophy of Heraclitus becomes less hypothetical, for it is grounded on considerably firmer sources. In terms of time they are close to them. It is these testimonies that bridge a gap between his doctrine and its most effective development with the Stoics.

A general conclusion from the analysis of the fragments with the word λόγος is that Epicharmus remained under an apparent influence of the Heraclitean Logos. He gives voice to it by bringing to mind similar meanings, among which the „rational” senses dominate; equally striking is the polyvalence of Logos, especially there where a profound „rationality” lies behind its expressive character (e.g. in frag. 87-89 tit. 1/K and 254 K/6 DK „argument” is a neatly constructed, verbal statement, that is „speech,” and at the same time its contents in the form of a logically correct „reasoning”). Both aspects of Epicharmus' logos continue the etymology, i.e. the rational-enunciative value of the noun λόγος, and at the same time confirm its twofold development. As it has been proved by our analyses, the way in which it is used in some fragments may be interpreted as a special response Epicharmus gave to Heraclitus' innovative attempt to entirely „rationalize” that word, thanks to which it has become one of the most important concepts in the whole history of Greek philosophy.