The Concept of λόγος in the Early Greek Thought. Part Two: The Idea of λόγος in Heraclitus of Ephesus
Abstract
The analyses found in this paper are a continuation of the research on the concept of λόγoς (see the author's paper entitled Rozwój pojęcia λόγoς we wczesnej myśli greckiej. Część I: Epika i liryka [The Concept of λόγoς and Its Development in the Early Greek Thought. Part One: Narrative Literature and Lyric Verse], „Roczniki Humanistyczne”, 44(1996), fasc. 3, pp. 21-51). There is abundant learned literature depicting various, often contradictory, interpretations of the Heraclitean logos, therefore we have deemed it purposeful to start our study from the presentation of the standpoints held by the modern researchers over the last century. It appears that scholars may be classified into three basic groups, according to the way they understood logos: 1) the first (e.g. Burnet, Gomperz, Gigon, Surig, West, Mansfeld, Diano, Serra, Conche) opt for the expressive and verbalizing aspect of logos, oscillating around oratio; the latter they translate as „word”, „story”, „narrative”, „relation, report”, „paper, treatise” and the like; we find among them staunch opponents of the idea of logos (Glasson, T.M. Robinson, Mansfeld); 2) others (e.g. Adam, Jaeger, Kirk, Wheelwright, Guthrie, J.M. Robinson, Hussey, Fattal, and McKirham) try to find the source of the meanings of logos in ratio, in that which is expressed and verbalized, such as „idea”, „reason”, „principle, rule, law”, „measure, proportion” and the like; 3) still others (Joja, Frenkian, Minar, Verdenius, Kahn) make efforts to agree these two extreme standpoints, claiming that the two aspects of logos − the expressive and rational one − are connected with each other in Heraclitus and cannot be separated without causing ambiguity. We share the latter opinion, the more so that the main argument about the lack of „rational” meanings of logos before Heraclitus or in his epoch is not confirmed, for in the texts of lyrical poets and narrative writers we have examined, including Herodotus' History (2, 33; 3, 45; 6, 124), in some sections of Leucippus (B 2), Parmenides (B 7), Epicharmus (B 2), one may find such senses, or similar senses, as e.g. „thinking”, „calculating”, „justifying”, „reason”, and „capability of understanding”.
The main subject matter of our studies is the semantic-philosophical dimension of logos, one of the concepts that Heraclitus most often used; the concept appears in ten extracts, and twice in the first one. We analyze its usages in the following order of extracts: B 1, B 2, B 72, B 50, B 108, B 39, B 87, B 45, B 115 and B 31 (a+b). Almost everywhere whenever logos appears, it is characterized by polyvalence and is a concept around which the philosopher's thought is composed. He uses, however, the obligatory linguistic usage, in order to develop further and deepen the semantic field of logos on this basis. Extract B 39 is a typical example here, wherein the „glory” (logos) of Bias flow from a wise „maxim” (logos) whose source is its exceptional „intelligence, reason” (logos). It is always with Heraclitus that behind the expressive and „superficial” character of logos is hidden profound rationality, causing his intended ambiguity and play on words. The reason why it is difficult to interpret and impossible to arrive at an unambiguous understanding of that concept result, most probably, from the threefold nature of logos: 1) it is understood as the human „thought” („opinion, science, theory”) about the world, expressed in the subjective „word” taking on the form of „lecture, work, treatise, collection of maxims”; 2) as contents, that is the object of that „word” in the form of objectively existing structure of the world; 3) the sources of that rational structure. This threefold character, in our opinion, is revealed in the extracts: 1, 50, 108, 87 and 45.
On the basis of the analyzed texts one may venture to put forward the following definition of logos in its philosophical aspect, a logos written with the capital „L” as the central concept in the Heraclitean vision of reality. Logos is a separate, independent of the human „word”, kind of being endowed with the following features: 1) eternity, for it always exists (ἐὼν ἀεί − B 1); 2) creativity, for it is thanks to logos that the world is brought into existence (γινόμενα πάντα κατὰ τὸν λόγον − B 1); 3) ubiquitousness, that is universality, for it exists in every form: a) its logical structure, constructed of opposites (ἒν πάντα εἶναι − B 50), b) its physical substrate, fire (πῦρ − B 30) and c) psychical (= rational) source of thinking (ξυνός − B 2; ψυχῆς βαϑὺς λόγος − B 115); 4) unity (identity in the logical and physical sense) with cosmos and its material − fire (κόσμος = πῦρ − B 30; ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα − B 10); 5) rationality, for it possesses wisdom and is a form of intelligence (σοφόν − B 108; ἓν τὸ σοφόν − B 41, B 32) endowed with thought (γνὼμη − B 41) which operates the world (ἐκυβέρνησε − B 41; οἰακίζει − B 64); 6) theoretical ineligibility i.e. a possibility to gain knowledge, e.g. for Heraclitus and Bias, (ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι − B 1; πλέων λόγος − B 39), though the majority of people fail to notice, neither do they understand, Logos (ἀξύνετοι, ἀπείροισι ἐοίκασι − B 1; ἰδία φρόνησις − B 2; see also B 72, B 108 and B 87); 7) divinity, for most probably Logos is identical with the divine Law (νόμος εἷς ὁ ϑεῖος − B 114) and with the person of God, binding in Himself all opposites (ὁ ϑεός − τάνατία ἃπαντα − B 67); 8) a necessity to know and practically act in accordance with this knowledge ὁμολογεῖν − B 50; cf. B 114, B 112, B 33). One should add to these attributes yet the „technical” function, which Logos-Fire fulfills in extract B 31. The cosmos identified with Fire (B 30) is transformed within certain limits (μέτρα − B 30; μετρέεται − B 31); those limits are determined by Logos in the sense of „measure, proportion (= quantitative relationship).” This is a constant regularity, a feature proper to the nature of fire closely linked (= identical) with Logos itself; thus the two aspects of reality converge in Logos: the material (fire) and the spiritual-rational one (reason, intelligence, and law). It seems then that Logos, as the ultimate and only guarantee of the existence of the cosmos and of each individual thing, also becomes the principal concept in the philosophy of Heraclitus. For it is on this concept that the Heraclitean theory of cognition is based, and it is in this concept that the theory of the unity of opposites is explained; it is with the concept of Logos, too, that the Heraclitean image of God and divine Fire is identified; eventually, Logos is the origin of the rational structure of the eternal, constantly changing, macrocosmos, as well as its human dimension − the microcosmos. In other words, Logos governs the life of man (by means of Logos, the „intelligence” of its soul), the life of an organized society, state (for the human rights draw their power on one, divine Law − B 114); Logos governs the whole universe, whose material fabric is Fire, endowed with immanent, governing rational power. The Heraclitean vision of Logos is − according to us − a very bold and innovative attempt at the explanation of the mystery of the world. Irrespective of some naivety and simplifications, it still deserves our admirable and worthy of recognition logos.
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