Writing/Text versus Dialectic in Platonic Philosophy

Abstract

The study seeks to take a stance in the ongoing discussions on the Platonic philosophy. The subject-matter of the debate is the status of writings in the Platonic philosophy, and to be more precise, to find an answer to the question whether Platonic writings are a reliable source for the re-construction of a “true” Plato’s philosophy. There are two schools: the Tübingen School and the Milan School, which have formulated the so-called “new paradigm” in which to interpret Plato. This paradigm assumes that in the Philosopher’s dialogues we shall not find, explicitly, his “true” knowledge about principles, the one that was lectured in the Academy. The paradigm uses two key arguments, the so-called Platonic “criticisms of the writing” (Faidros, Letter VII), according to which the “true” philosophy, carried out in a living dialectic discourse with a partner or disciple, may not be fixed in the form of writing. The study sought to verify evaluations of particular excerpts from Platonic writings as a criticism of the writing/text, especially the part of the Letter VII. The point is also to reconstruct Platonic dialectic: synoptic dialectic whose point of departure is αἴσqησις (sense perception). This dialectic makes one approve of the necessity of some general concepts understood as models (παραδείγματα). The author defines this dialectic as hypothetical (ὑπόqεσις), for it leads to assume the ontic status of those models understood as transcendent beings. Now, the diaretic (διαίρεσις) dialectic studies general concepts and leads to the definition of individual objects. The analysis of Platonic dialectic on the basis of the writings from the Middle Academy and the Late Academy makes us conclude that dialectic procedures may be realized only in the philosopher's mind, within the area of thinking, in the area of pure concepts, to which the words of discourse, as signs, may only refer. For a discourse is carried on in words which – as the philosopher states in the Kratilos – cannot reflect “the truth of things.” The philosopher-dialectician therefore has no partner. The course and outcomes of a dialectic procedure may be fixed in writing both for didactic, propedeuctic, or protreptic purposes, and such is the purpose of Platonic writings.