Mechanizmy poznawcze teorii umysłu

  • Agnieszka Pluta Wydział Psychologii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Słowa kluczowe: teoria umysłu; funkcjonalny rezonans magnetyczny; przezczaszkowa stymulacja magnetyczna; funkcje wykonawcze; funkcje językowe; uszkodzenie mózgu

Abstrakt

Celem artykułu jest zapoznanie polskiego czytelnika ze stanem wiedzy dotyczącym mechanizmów poznawczych leżących u podstaw teorii umysłu. W artykule omówiono zarówno koncepcje teoretyczne będące podstawą rozumienia zdolności do dokonywania atrybucji stanów mentalnych innych osób, jak i najnowsze badania wykorzystujące metody neuroobrazowania mózgu (funkcjonalny rezonans magnetyczny, przezczaszkową stymulację magnetyczną) oraz badania pacjentów z uszkodzonym mózgiem. Dyskutowane są kolejno wyniki badań odnoszące się do: a) mózgowej lokalizacji teorii umysłu, b) relacji między teorią umysłu a funkcjami wykonawczymi oraz językiem, c) dysocjacji między poznawczym a emocjonalnym komponentem teorii umysłu. Na podstawie przeglądu literatury przedmiotu opisano również wyzwania i trudności metodologiczne, które towarzyszą badaniom nad mózgowym podłożem teorii umysłu w normie i w patologii.

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2019-03-29
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