Cognitive mechanisms of theory of mind
Abstract
The goal of the article is to familiarize Polish reader with the current state of knowledge about cognitive mechanisms of theory of mind. In the article, the author presents theoretical framework underlying capacity to understand mental states of others as well as the most recent neuroimagining methods (functional magnetic resonance, transcranial magnetic stimulation) and studies of patients with brain impairments. The author discusses: brain localization of theory of mind, relation between theory of mind and executive functions and language, dissociation between cognitive and affective theory of mind. On the basis of literature review, the author indicates methodological challenges and difficulties pertaining to research on brain mechanisms underlying theory of mind in norm and pathology.
References
Apperly, I. A., Samson, D., Carroll, N., Hussain, S., Humphreys, G. W. (2006). Intact first and second-order false belief reasoning in a patient with severely impaired grammar. Social Neuroscience, 1, 3-4, 334-348.
Apperly, I. A., Samson, D., Chiavarino, C., Humphreys, G. W. (2004). Frontal and temporo-parietal lobe contribution to Theory of Mind: Neuropsychological evidence from a false belief task with reduced language and executive demands. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16, 10, 1773-1784.
Apperly, I. A., Samson, D., Humphreys, G. W. (2005). Domain-specificity and theory of mind: Evaluating evidence from neuropsychology. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 12, 572-577.
Astington, J. W., Dack, L. A. (2008). Theory of Mind. W: M. M. Haith, J. B. Benson (red.), Encyclopedia of infant and early childhood development (vol. 3, s. 343-356). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Astington, J. W., Jenkins, J. M. (1999). A longitudinal study of the relation between language and theory-of-mind development. Developmental Psychology, 35, 1311-1320.
Bach, L. J., Happé, F., Fleminger, S. Powell, J. (2000). Theory of mind: Independence of executive function and the role of the frontal cortex in acquired brain injury. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 5, 175-192.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind. Cambridge: Brandford/MIT Press.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1998). Does the study of autism justify minimalist innate modularity. Learning and Individual Differences, 10, 3, 179-191.
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A., Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”? Cognition, 21, 37-46.
Baron-Cohen, S., Tager-Flusberg, H., Cohen, D. (2000). Understanding other minds: Perspectives rom developmental cognitive neuroscience. Oxford: University Press.
Białecka-Pikul, M. (2002). Co dzieci wiedzą o umyśle i myśleniu. Kraków: Wydawnictwo UJ.
Bibby, H., McDonald, S. (2005). Theory of mind after traumatic brain injury. Neuropsychologia, 43, 99-114.
Blair, R. J. R. (2005). Responding to the emotions of others: Dissociating forms of empathy through the study of typical and psychiatric populations. Consciousness and Cognition, 14, 698-718.
Brune, M., Brune-Cohrs, U. (2006). Theory of mind-evolution, ontogeny, brain mechanisms and psychopathology. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 30, 437-455.
Cabeza, R., Kingstone, A. (2009). Handbook of functional neuroimaging of cognition. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Carlson, S. M., Moses, L. J., Claxton, L. J. (2004). Individual differences in executive functioning and theory of mind: An investigation of inhibitory control and planning ability. Journal Experimental Child Psychology, 87, 299-319.
Champagne-Lavau, M., Joanette, Y. (2009). Pragmatics, theory of mind and executive functions after a right-hemisphere lesion: Different patterns of deficits. Journal of Neurolinguistics, 22, 5, 413-426.
Channon, S., Pellijeff, A., Rule, A. (2005). Social cognition after head injury: Sarcasm and theory of mind. Brain and Language, 93, 2, 123-134.
Decety, J., Jackson, P. L. (2006). A social neuroscience perspective of empathy. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 15, 54-58.
De Villiers, J. (2002). Complements to cognition: A longitudinal study of the relationship between complex syntax and false-belief-understanding. Cognitive Development, 17, 1, 1037-1060.
Doherty, M. J. (2009). Theory of mind: How children understand others’ thoughts and feelings. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
Domańska, Ł., Borkowska, A. (2008). Podstawy neuropsychologii klinicznej. Lublin: UMCS.
Farrant, A., Morris, R. G., Russell, T., Elwes, R., Akanuma, N., Alarcón, G., Koutroumanidis, M. (2005). Social cognition in frontal lobe epilepsy. Epilepsy & Behavior, 7, 3, 506-516.
Farrar, M. J., Johnson, B., Tompkins, V., Easters, M., Zilisi-Medus, A., Benigno, J. P. (2009). Language and theory of mind in preschool children with specific language impairment. Journal of Communication Disorders, 42, 6, 428-441.
Fodor, J. A. (1983). Modularity of mind: An essay on faculty psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Frith, U., Frith, C. D. (2003). Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing. Philosophical Transactions of Royal Society of London (Series B: Biogical Sciences), 358, 459-473.
Gavilán, J. M., García-Albea, J. E. (2011). Theory of mind and language comprehension in schizophrenia: Poor mindreading affects figurative language comprehension beyond intelligence deficits. Journal of Neurolinguistics, 24, 1, 54-69.
Gopnik, A., Astington, J. W. (1988). Children’s understanding of representational change and its relation to the understanding of false belief and the appearance-reality distinction. Child Development, 59, 26-37.
Gopnik, A., Wellman, H. (1992). Why the child’s theory of mind really is a theory. Mind and Language, 7, 145-171.
Haman, M. (1992). Dziecięca ,,teoria umysłu” a kompetencja komunikacyjna dziecka w wieku przedszkolnym. W: B. Bokus, M. Haman (red.), Z badań nad kompetencją komunikacyjną dzieci (s. 229-253). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Energeia.
Haman, M. (2002). Pojęcia i ich rozwój. Percepcja, doświadczenie i naiwne teorie. Warszawa: Matrix.
Happé, F. (1995). The role of age and verbal ability in the theory of mind task performance of subjects with autism. Child Development, 66, 843-855.
Happé, F., Frith, U. (1996). The neuropsychology of autism. Brain, 19, 1377-1400.
Henry, J. D., Phillips, L. H., Crawford, J. R., Ietswaart, M., Summers, F. (2006a). Theory of mind following traumatic brain injury: The role of emotion recognition and executive dysfunction. Neuropsychologia, 44, 10, 1623-1628.
Hernik, M. (2007). Pojęcie zamiaru w rozwoju teorii umysłu i teorii wytworów człowieka (mps pracy doktorskiej, Wydział Psychologii UW).
Herzyk A. (2005). Wprowadzenie do neuropsychologii klinicznej. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
Huettel, S., Song, A., McCarthy, G. (2004). Functional magnetic resonance imaging. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates, Inc.
Jenkins, J. M., Astington, J. W. (1996). Cognitive factors and family structure associated with theory of mind development in young children. Developmental Psychology, 32, 70-78.
Kalbe, E., Schlegel, M., Sack, A. T., Nowak, D. A., Dafotakis, M., Bangard, C., Brand, M. [i in.] (2010). Dissociating cognitive from affective theory of mind: A TMS study. Cortex, 46, 6, 769-780.
Kurcz, I., H. Okuniewska, H. (2011). Język jako przedmiot badań psychologicznych. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo SWPS Academica.
Leslie, A. (1991). The theory of mind impairment in autism: Evidence for a modular mechanism of development? W: A. Whiten (red.), Natural theories of mind (s. 63-78). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Leslie, A. M., Thaiss, L. (1992). Domain specificity in conceptual development: Neuropsychological evidence from autism. Cognition, 43, 225-251.
Lezak, M. D. (1995). Neuropsychological assessment (3). New York: Oxford University Press.
Liu, D., Henry, M., Wellman, H., Tardif, T., Sabbagh, M. (2008). Theory of mind development in Chinese children: A meta-analysis of false-belief understanding across cultures and languages. Developmental Psychology, 44, 2, 523-531.
Lough, S., Hodges, J. R. (2002). Measuring and modifying abnormal social cognition in frontal variant frontotemporal dementia. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 53, 639-646.
Martin, I., McDonald, S. (2003). Weak coherence, no theory of mind, or executive dysfunction? Solving the puzzle of pragmatic language disorders. Brain and Language, 85, 3, 451-466.
Milders, M., Fuchs, S., Crawford, J. R. (2003). Neuropsychological impairments and changes in emotional and social behaviour following severe traumatic brain injury. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology (Section A: Neuropsychology, Development and Cognition), 25, 2, 157-172.
Moore, C., Bryant, D., Furrow, D. (1989). Mental terms and the development of certainty. Child Development, 60, 167-171.
Perner, J., Lang, B. (1999). Development of theory of mind and executive control. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3, 337-344.
Perner, J., Leekam, S. R., Wimmer, H. (1987). Three-year olds’ difficulty with false belief: The case for a conceptual deficit. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 5, 125-137.
Peterson, C. (2003). Opening windows into the mind: Mothers’ preferences for mental state explanations and children’s theory of mind. Cognitive Development, 18, 3, 399-429.
Peterson, C. C., Siegal, M. (1999). Representing inner worlds: Theory of mind in autistic, deaf, and normal hearing children. Psychological Science, 10, 126-129.
Pisula, E. (2000). Autyzm: diagnoza, klasyfikacja, etiologia. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
Plaut, D. C., Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1993). Representational development and theory-of-mind computations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 1, 70-71.
Putko, A. (2004a). Teoria umysłu a zakres efektu starszego rodzeństwa oraz jego związki z zabawą w udawanie i kontrolą hamowania. Studia Psychologiczne, 42, 2, 69-80.
Putko, A. (2004b). Kognitywny i percepcyjny komponent teorii umysłu: jak silne są powiązania? Studia Psychologiczne, 42, 4, 107-118.
Premack, D. G., Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1, 515-526.
Samson, D., Apperly, I., Chiavarino C., Humphreys, G. (2004). Left temporoparietal junction is necessary for representing someone else’s belief. Nature Neuroscience, 7, 499-500.
Saxe, R. (2006a). Why and how to study theory of mind with fMRI. Brain Research, 1079, 1, 57-65.
Saxe, R. (2006b). Uniquely human social cognition. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 16, 235-239.
Saxe, R. (2008). The happiness of the fish: Evidence for a common theory of one’s own and others’ actions. W: K. Markman, W. Klein, J. Suhr (red.), The handbook of imagination and mental simulation. New York: Psychology Press.
Saxe, R. (2009). Theory of mind (neural basis). Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Oxford, UK: Academic Press.
Saxe, R., Kanwisher, N. (2003). People thinking about thinking people: The role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind”. Neuroimage, 19, 1835-1842.
Saxe, R., Schulz, L., Jiang, Y. (2006c). Reading minds versus following rules social. Neuroscience, 1, 3-4, 284-298.
Saxe, R., Wexler, A. (2005). Making sense of another mind: The role of the right temporo-parietal junction. Neuropsychologia, 43, 10, 1391-1399.
Saxe, R., Xiao, D. K., Kovacs, G., Perrett, D. I., Kanwisher, N. (2004). A region of right posterior superior temporal sulcus responds to observed intentional actions. Neuropsychologia, 42, 11, 1435-1446.
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Aharon-Peretz, J. (2007). Dissociable prefrontal networks for cognitive and affective theory of mind: A lesion study. Neuropsychologia, 45, 13, 3054-3067.
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Tomer, R., Berger, B. D., Aharon-Peretz, J. (2003). Characterization of empathy deficits following prefrontal brain damage: The role of the right ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 15, 3, 324-337.
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Tomer, R., Berger, B. D., Goldsher, D. (2005). Impaired ,,affective theory of mind” is associated with right ventromedial prefrontal damage. Cognition and Behavioral Neurology, 18, 55-67.
Spatt, J., Zebenholzer, K., Oder, W. (1997). Psychosocial longterm outcome of severe head injury as perceived by patients, relatives, and professionals. Acta Neurologica Scandinavica, 95, 3, 173-179.
Stone, V., Gerrans, P. (2006). Does the normal brain have a theory of mind? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 1, 3-4.
Surian, L., Siegal, M. (2001). Sources of performance on theory of minds tasks in right hemisphere-damaged patients. Brain and Language, 78, 224-232.
Temple, C. (1997). Developmental cognitive neuropsychology. East Sussex, UK: Psychology Press Hove.
Tirassa, M., Bosco, F. M., Colle, L. (2006). Rethinking the ontogeny of mindreading. Consciousness and Cognition, 15, 197-217.
Young, L., Camprodon, J., Hauser, M., Pascual-Leone, A., Saxe, R. (2010). Disruption of the right temporo-parietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgment. PNAS, 107, 6753-6758.
Verley, R., Siegal, M. (2000). Evidence for cognition without grammar from causal reasoning and “theory of mind” in an agrammatic aphasic patent. Current Biology, 10, 723-726.
Wimmer, H., Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 13, 103-128.
Zatichik, D. (1990). When representations conflict with reality: The preschooler’s problem with false beliefs and “false” photographs. Cognition, 35, 41-68.
Copyright (c) 2012 Roczniki Psychologiczne
![Creative Commons License](http://i.creativecommons.org/l/by-nc-nd/4.0/88x31.png)
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.