Teologia aktualnej sekwencji
Abstrakt
Autor w swoim artykule szkicuje obraz ogólnej teologii, która odchodzi od koncepcji wolności jako „alternatywnych możliwości” na rzecz wolności jako „aktualnej sekwencji”. Autor odróżnia swoje podejście od rozwiniętej teorii teizmu otwartego Williama Haskera. Pogląd autora na temat Bożej przedwiedzy mieści się pomiędzy ideą pełnej przedwiedzy a ideą jej całkowitego braku (teizm otwarty).
Bibliografia
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