Roczniki Filozoficzne <p><strong>Roczniki Filozoficzne (The </strong><strong>Annals of Philosophy)</strong> is the major journal of the Faculty of Philosophy at The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. It is one of the oldest philosophical journals in Poland (since 1948). It is published four times per year in both the online and traditional ways. The journal aims to publish the best original research papers in philosophy, as well as translations, reviews, accounts and polemics.</p> Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL & Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II en-US Roczniki Filozoficzne 2450-002X Why Hope Cannot Be an Intellectual Virtue: Rationality of Hope Considered from an Analytic Perspective <p>There are two aims of the paper. The first is to critically analyse the claim that hope can be regarded as an intellectual virtue, as proposed by Nancy E. Snow (2013) in her recent account of hope set within the project of regulative epistemology. The second aim is to explore the problem of rationality of hope. Section one of the paper explains two different interpretations of the key notion of hope and discusses certain features to be found in <em>hope-that</em> and <em>hope-in</em>. Section two addresses the question of whether hope could be interpreted as an intellectual virtue. To develop an argument against that view, a brief account of the notion of <em>epistemic virtue</em> is provided. Section three analyses the problem of rationality of hope and the parallels between rational belief and rational hope; the section focuses on what exactly makes a particular <em>hope-that</em> a rational and justified hope. Belief that <em>p</em> is possible/probable is part of the meaning of hope that <em>p</em>; therefore, it is assumed that rationality of hope cannot be considered in isolation from rationality of belief. It is argued that the “standard account” of the reasonableness of hope, which is found in the analytic literature, does not meet the standards of epistemic responsibility and needs rectifying.</p> Elżbieta Łukasiewicz Copyright (c) 2021 Roczniki Filozoficzne 2021-06-28 2021-06-28 69 2 5 37 10.18290/rf21692-1 Body–Soul and the Birth and Death of Man: Benedict Hesse’s Opinion in the Mediaeval Discussion <p>This issue was discussed with regard to chosen commentaries to Aristotle’s treatise <em>De anima, </em>formed in the so-called <em>via moderna </em>mainstream, in particular those of John Buridan, Nicole Oresme and Laurentius of Lindores. In such a context, the Cracovian commentaries referring to Parisian nominalists were presented by those of Benedict Hesse and Anonymus. The analyses carried out above allow one to ascertain that although William of Ockham’s opinion questioning the possibility of knowledge of the soul in the field of philosophy, nominalists of the late Middle Ages did not resign from speculation on the beginning (birth) and the separation (death) from the body of the soul, also the fate of the soul after death. They focused on the nature of the matter – human body (embryo, semen) and his relation with the soul (forma) – in the moment of birth. In the aspect of death 14<sup>th</sup> century scholars undertook the struggle, which was one with the justification of the psycho-physical unity of the human being existing after death solely as an immortal soul.</p> <p>&nbsp;In both thems, they tried to find their solutions, while if they could not solve these aporeticals questions – they had the courage to admit, that is not possible by solely relying on the natural forces of reason. They had to refer to the teaching of christianity, without however falling prey to fideism. This was a methodical endeavour based on the experience that natural reason in searching for the truth is not capable of its own efforts to attain to certain concepts and might on occasion err, it is then that faith becomes its guide and supplies it with more acceptable solutions. This is the courage of one of the greatest philosophers – Plato, who said that you have to have this “great courage” to undertake only probable knowledge, when another is not possible.</p> Wanda Bajor Copyright (c) 2021 Roczniki Filozoficzne 2021-06-28 2021-06-28 69 2 39 63 10.18290/rf21692-2 About Persistent Therapy and Ordinary and Extraordinary Means in the Polish Bioethical Context: On the Margin of Two Debates of the Polish Bioethics Society <p>In this paper, I consider an opinion concerning of resignation from the term ‘persistent therapy’ and the need to replace it with the term ‘medical futility’. I also consider the usability of the division of medical means into ordinary and extraordinary. I present my arguments against the rejection of the term ‘persistent therapy’ as well as I try to show that the classification of medical means, which it combines the concept pairs “proportionate/ disproportionate” and “ordinary/extraordinary,” may serve as an effective aid in making decisions on abandoning persistent therapy both for the physician and for the patient. The subject-matter of my reflection is the definition of persistent therapy elaborated by the Polish Working Group for End-of-Life Ethics and its modified version. The basic context of the analyses consists of opinions of some authors taking part in debates on persistent therapy and medical futility held by the Polish Bioethics Society.</p> Marcin Ferdynus Copyright (c) 2021 Roczniki Filozoficzne 2021-06-28 2021-06-28 69 2 65 81 10.18290/rf21692-3 Ambivalence of Greek Hope <p>The article is an attempt to recreate the Greek thinking about the phenomenon of hope. Multilevel ambivalence has been found. Firstly, as expecting either something good or something bad. Then, as a negative hope (in the sense of unreasonable, irrational and leading to crisis) or a positive hope (in the sense of justified, rational and enabling salvation). Finally, as a morally good or bad hope, depending upon the ethical evaluation of its subject. Also, a correlation of fear and hope has been found. The problem of referring hope to time has been put forward. In this context, the views of Hesiod, Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics have been considered.</p> Jacek Filek Copyright (c) 2021 Roczniki Filozoficzne 2021-06-28 2021-06-28 69 2 83 99 10.18290/rf21692-4 What Kind of Reasoning Is, according to Aristotle, the Argument by Example (Paradeigma)? <p>The paradigm (example) is an inductive argument in rhetoric. However, the paradigm is not about moving from many specific cases to a certain generalization, i.e. universalization of all individual cases — as it normally happens in inductive argumentation. Instead, it is rather a transition from one detail to another similar one; with the condition being that both specific cases belong to the same type. Therefore, the paradigm is not an induction in the strict sense, but it seems more to meet the conditions of analogy. The article formulates the thesis that Aristotle distinguishes three types of inference: deduction, induction and analogy. In order to demonstrate the specific nature of inference by the paradigm, which seems to be a type of analogy, other types of inferences are also examined, i.e. apodeictic, dialectical, and inductive syllogisms.</p> <p>The article is an attempt to present the characteristics of argumentation by paradigm and show its specific nature in the light of Aristotle’s <em>Rhetoric</em> and his logical writings: <em>Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics,</em> and <em>Sophistical Refutations.</em></p> Andrzej P. Stefańczyk Copyright (c) 2021 Roczniki Filozoficzne 2021-06-28 2021-06-28 69 2 101 129 10.18290/rf21692-5 The Model of the Multipartite Soul as the Antic Horizon of the Question of the Human Will in the Light of the Nicomachean Ethics 1111b and the Republic 437B – 440D <p>An analysis of the concept of resolution (προαίρεσις) and rational desire (βούλησις) in the third book of the <em>Nicomachean</em> <em>Ethics</em> 1111B leads Aristotle to discuss the problem of weakness of will (ἀκρασία) in the context of the relationship between reason, lust and anger. The philosophical source of the possibility of such a discussion is most likely the text of the fourth book of&nbsp;<em>Politea</em>, in which Plato founded the theory of the multipartite soul, thus making it possible to answer the question about the sources of motivation for human action that are different from reason. Thus, Plato resolves the <em>aporia</em> of Socratic intellectualism, in the light of which the reason responsible for human motivations is in contradiction to the phenomena of action devoid of the features of rationality and self-control. The juxtaposition of the text of <em>Nicomachean Ethics</em> 111B and <em>Politea</em> 437B–440D opens the horizon of the question about the possibility of the Platonic genesis of human volitional acts and, in the longer term, also the concept of human will. The fruit of this juxtaposition is an attempt to interpret the Platonic theory of the soul in the light of the Aristotelian concept of ὄρεξις, by means of which the Stagirite distinguishes three elements of the soul analogous to Platonic reason, lust and anger (λογισμός — ἐπιθυμία — βμολς), such as rational desire, θυμοειδές — ἐπιθυμητικόν). The perception of the possibility of the Platonic genesis of volitional acts defined later by Augustine in the context of the concept of the will (<em>voluntas</em>) is based on the finding of a relationship between rational desire interpreted by Aristotle as a volitional act (βούλησις) and Plato’s interpretation of reason not only as an intellect, but also as a dynamics that appears on the one hand in the form of erotic power (<em>Symposium</em>, <em>Phaedrus</em>) and on the other hand in the form of rational desire (<em>Hippias Minor</em>, <em>Gorgias</em>).</p> Piotr Pasterczyk Copyright (c) 2021 Roczniki Filozoficzne 2021-06-28 2021-06-28 69 2 131 158 10.18290/rf21692-6 Philosopher to Philosopher: Regarding a Letter by Bolesław Miciński to Fr. Augustyn Jakubisiak <p>The article presents an unknown letter by Bolesław Miciński to Fr. Augustyn Jakubisiak found in his archives at the Polish Library in Paris. It is an opportunity to call to mind these outstanding but somewhat forgotten philosophers and to present their intellectual connections. After meeting in Paris in 1937, they maintained close contact until the death of Miciński in 1943. From the beginning, they were united by their opposition to the idealistic German philosophy and neopositivism of the Vienna Circle with its materialism, scientism and scepticism. In Fr. Jakubisiak, Miciński discovered views similar to his own on space and time. In Miciński’s recent essays from the war, there are moral theses that Fr. Jakubisiak has voiced, namely individuality and self-determination. Individuality means valuing an individual in the face of everything that may threaten him, especially totalitarianism. In turn, self-determination is the granting of absolute autonomy and freedom to human beings, which acts in the previously adopted way. It was the negation of determinism and atheism. The contexts of Miciński’s statements on the subject of individuality and self-determination (as well as the less outlined problems of time and space) indicate that he not only took from Fr.&nbsp;Jakubisiak the concepts relevant to him, but also embedded them in a close philosophical context. The thought of a Polish clergyman must have been doubly inspirational for Miciński. First, he discovered in his works known philosophizing styles derived from St Augustine, Leibniz, Pascal or Kant. On the other hand, he expanded his own search field and found answers to relevant existential questions; he turned towards modern science (for instance Einstein’s theory), and especially to Christianity, which became for him an increasingly important intellectual and spiritual asylum.</p> Ryszard Zajączkowski Copyright (c) 2021 Roczniki Filozoficzne 2021-06-28 2021-06-28 69 2 159 178 10.18290/rf21692-7 Christian Philosophy as a Research Tradition: An Attempt at an Analysis from the Standpoint of the Philosophy of Science <p>The aim of this article is to present a characterization of Christian philosophy in terms of the notion of a research tradition. Since the work of Larry Laudan, it has been thought that the latter notion could prove useful for shedding light on the idea of Christian philosophy. To this end, the author first introduces the key concept of a ‘research tradition,’ and then proceeds to analyse the notion of an ‘image of the world,’ understood as something invariably associated with specific research traditions. The next step is the construction of a definition of Christian philosophy as a&nbsp;research tradition in project-based terms. The author sets out to demonstrate that Christian philosophy, as such a tradition, is both pluralistic and democratized. In conclusion, several higher-order proposals are formulated with respect to the right method for pursuing Christian philosophy. In particular, the approach adopted should be one oriented towards possibilities of discussion: i.e. a non-dictatorial game unfolding with the participation of representatives from various research traditions who endorse different images of the world.</p> Piotr Duchliński Copyright (c) 2021 Roczniki Filozoficzne 2021-06-28 2021-06-28 69 2 179 213 10.18290/rf21692-8 The Problem of Representation in Science: Unexplored Areas <p>The problem of representation in science (which is different from the issue of mental representations in the philosophy of mind) is vastly examined in the contemporary philosophy of science but the investigations include only empirical sciences. Moreover, the dominating results of this research are defectively limited to one type of identification of the relation of representation, namely that of similarity, especially of isomorphism. In this paper, I demonstrate that the issue of representation in science has three shortcomings and flaws which need to be eradicated by revealing new research areas and, as a result, by initiating new type of research. More concretely, the issue of representation (1) is limited to the dubious identifying of representation with similarity, (2) does not include the representation in technical and IT sciences, (3) does not distinguish between descriptive-explanatory (theoretical) sciences and applied (prescriptive) sciences. Differences in representing, including types of represented and representing objects, demonstrate the most profound difference in the natures of these sciences. Therefore, delving deeper into the issues of representing opens some whole new areas for inquiry which can lead to a richer and broader conception of sciences than those attained till now. It is astonishing that the problem of representation, so crucial for images of sciences, is examined so narrowly and selectively in the today philosophy.</p> Mariusz Mazurek Copyright (c) 2021 Roczniki Filozoficzne 2021-06-28 2021-06-28 69 2 215 239 10.18290/rf21692-9 Structurality and Deductivity of Mathematics: Contemporary Structuralism in the Philosophy of Mathematics <p>It is common for different types of mathematical structuralism that the conjunction of two statements ( a) mathematics is science about structures and b) mathematics is deductive science) is true, Distinct arguments for this two features of mathematics are exanimated therefore the main concepts (structurality and deductivity) are understood differently, the results are various types of structuralism. We claim that it is possible to establish the way of understood of this two concepts in witeh they are equivalent. We argue that can interpret mathematical structuralism as equivalence: a) mathematics is science about structures if and only, if b) mathematics is deductive science</p> Marcin Czakon Copyright (c) 2021 Roczniki Filozoficzne 2021-06-28 2021-06-28 69 2 241 268 10.18290/rf21692-10 On Inadequacy of Bertrand Russell’s Distinction between Primary and Secondary Occurrences of Denoting Phrases <p>In his seminal work „On denoting” Bertrand Russell introduces distinction between primary and secondary occurrences of denoting phrases. The distinction enables description of ambiguities of some statements containing denoting phrases. As Saul Kripke pointed, although Russell’s distinction seems to be dual, it is possible that some ambiguous statements containing denoting phrases can be interpreted in more than just two ways. In present article I argue that there are even some other possible interpretations, not mentioned neither by Russell, nor by Kripke. Furthermore I am showing that those other possible interpretations are also distinct from so called Fodor’s readings.</p> Piotr Lipski Copyright (c) 2021 Roczniki Filozoficzne 2021-06-28 2021-06-28 69 2 269 284 10.18290/rf21692-11 Gabriel Marcel and Heterocentric Ethics <p>The article presents ethical dimension of Gabriel Marcel’s philosophical thought. Concerning several categories that it contains (including trial, betrayal, community, sacrifice, presence, availability, intersubjectivity, love) it is described as heterocentric. This term, taken from the very writings of Marcel, is here applicated in order to distinguish it from the terms already well-established in the literature (yet related mainly to later ideas), such as “philosophy of the other” or&nbsp;“identity-difference dialectics”; in general, it points to an attitude towards the other, which, however, leads to internal self-recovery. There is a task in front of a man on the road: to answer a call coming from both the inside and the outside; ultimately the aim is to anchor one’s own existence in the depth of reality which exceeds it. It is also shown that Marcel's ethics does not evade ontology, and that the answer to the question of how to live is inextricably linked with the reflection over being.</p> Michał Węcławski Copyright (c) 2021 Roczniki Filozoficzne 2021-06-28 2021-06-28 69 2 285 303 10.18290/rf21692-12 Man and the World of Animals according to Robert Spaemann <p>The article presents some threads of interesting philosophical and ethical analyses by&nbsp;Robert Spaemann on the animal world, undertaken by him in the Aristotelian spirit. They concern issues that seem to be of particular interest to both: experts on the subject and contemporary man. These are: nature (its specificity) and the ontic status of animals, suffering and its sources (including experiments and training), killing animals and eating their flesh.</p> <p>Spaemann not only did not question, but also, in the spirit of classical and contemporary thought (Helmuth Plessner), originally emphasised the essence of man over animals. He did it, among others, by emphasising the human ability to self-relativizing.</p> <p>According to the eminent German thinker, the ethical principles regulating our relationship to animals are closely related to the metaphysical understanding of their being. These principles are based on the teleological nature of our smaller brothers and the subjective form of their existence. Spaemann emphasised the role of kindness, responsibility and care, the utilitarian principle of the profit and loss account, Kant’s categorical imperative and the personalistic norm. On the other hand, he developed the obligation to protect animals and&nbsp;responsible for them in the context of human dignity.</p> <p>The article attempts to show the importance of the teleological perspective, which no one has shown so clearly and convincingly in relation to animals in contemporary German philosophy. The article also compared his position on the animal world with the vision of Peter Singer. First of all, the article attempts to reconstruct Spaemann’s thought on the ethical and&nbsp;metaphysical aspects of man’s relationship to animals.</p> Józef Kożuchowski Copyright (c) 2021 Roczniki Filozoficzne 2021-06-28 2021-06-28 69 2 305 328 10.18290/rf21692-13 The Weakness of Liberal Democracy a Lever to the Success of Anti-Establishment Parties: Chantal Mouffe on Challenges of the Political <p>Today in Europe we are witnessing a populist turn, we could even speak of a “populist moment” that signals the crisis of neoliberal democracy. According to Chantal Mouffe, “the populist moment” is the expression of a set of heterogeneous demands, which cannot be formulated in traditional right/left frontier. The battles of our time will be between right-wing and left-wing populism. Although the current state of liberal societies appears to favor the development of a Right project, Mouffe proves that just a left-wing one can uphold any kind of radicalisation of democracy. The aim of this paper is to examine the reasons for the increasing success of populist parties in European countries and to consider whether the way the present crisis is manifesting is conducive to the growth of a populist narrative, especially in its right-wing variant.</p> Małgorzata Borkowska-Nowak Copyright (c) 2021 Roczniki Filozoficzne 2021-06-28 2021-06-28 69 2 329 346 10.18290/rf21692-14 Mind-Body Problem Revisited (rec.: Philip Goff. Galileo’s Error: Foundations for the New Science of Consciousness) Jacek Jarocki Copyright (c) 2021 Roczniki Filozoficzne 2021-06-28 2021-06-28 69 2 347 351 10.18290/rf21692-15 A Very Short Introduction to Scepticism (rec.: Duncan Pritchard. Scepticism: A Very Short Introduction) Francisco Angel P. Socrates Copyright (c) 2021 Roczniki Filozoficzne 2021-06-28 2021-06-28 69 2 352 358 10.18290/rf21692-16 Transformations of Metaphysics into Ontology (rev.: Bogusław Paź. filum cognitionis. Przemiany nowożytnej metafizyki w ontologię od Suareza do Kanta [FILUM COGNITIONIS. Transformations of Modern Metaphysics into Ontology from Suarez to Kant]) Izabela Pasternak Copyright (c) 2021 Roczniki Filozoficzne 2021-06-28 2021-06-28 69 2 358 365 10.18290/rf21692-17