Roczniki Filozoficzne https://ojs.tnkul.pl/index.php/rf <p><strong>Roczniki Filozoficzne (The </strong><strong>Annals of Philosophy)</strong> is the major journal of the Faculty of Philosophy at The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. It is one of the oldest philosophical journals in Poland (since 1948). It is published four times per year in both the online and traditional ways. The journal aims to publish the best original research papers in philosophy, as well as translations, reviews, accounts and polemics.</p> Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL & Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II en-US Roczniki Filozoficzne 2450-002X Introduction—Sketches from an Album https://ojs.tnkul.pl/index.php/rf/article/view/17334 William Hasker Copyright (c) 2022 Roczniki Filozoficzne http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 70 1 7 13 10.18290/rf2201.1 Anti-Naturalistic Arguments From Reason https://ojs.tnkul.pl/index.php/rf/article/view/17335 <p>This paper discusses a wide range of anti-naturalistic argument from reason due to Balfour, Haldane, Joad, Lewis, Taylor, Moreland, Plantinga, Reppert, and Hasker. I argue that none of these arguments poses a serious challenge to naturalists who are identity theorists. Further, I argue that some of these arguments do not even pose prima facie plausible challenges to naturalism. In the concluding part of my discussion, I draw attention to some distinctive differences between Hasker’s anti-naturalistic arguments and the other anti-naturalistic arguments mentioned above.</p> Graham Oppy Copyright (c) 2022 Roczniki Filozoficzne http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 70 1 15 35 10.18290/rf2201.2 Some Musings about William Hasker’s Philosophy of Mind https://ojs.tnkul.pl/index.php/rf/article/view/17336 <p>While William Hasker and I for the most part broadly agree in our opposition to much of the contemporary philosophical community concerning issues in the philosophy of mind that he discusses in his book, there are nevertheless seemingly some domestic disputes between him and me about certain matters concerning the nature of events involving the self. In this paper, I will focus on two of these disagreements. The first disagreement concerns Hasker’s treatment of what is widely known today as the argument from reason and whether the events involved in our reasoning are essentially causal or teleological in nature. The second disagreement is about Hasker’s account of libertarian freedom, and whether agent causation is required to explain our free choices.</p> Stewart Goetz Copyright (c) 2022 Roczniki Filozoficzne http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 70 1 37 48 10.18290/rf2201.3 An Actual-Sequence Theology https://ojs.tnkul.pl/index.php/rf/article/view/17337 <p>In this paper I develop a sketch of an overall theology that dispenses with “alternative-possibilities” freedom in favor of “actual-sequence” freedom. I hold that acting freely does not require freedom to do otherwise, and that acting freely is the freedom component of moral responsibility. Employing this analytical apparatus, I show how we can offer various important elements of a theology that employs only the notion of acting freely. I distinguish my approach from the important development of Open Theism by William Hasker. My view about God’s foreknowledge is in-between comprehensive foreknowledge and no foreknowledge (Open Theism).</p> John Martin Fischer Copyright (c) 2022 Roczniki Filozoficzne http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 70 1 49 78 10.18290/rf2201.4 Saving Eternity (and Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will): A Reply to Hasker https://ojs.tnkul.pl/index.php/rf/article/view/17338 <p>William Hasker and I disagree over whether or not appealing to a particular understanding of divine eternity can reconcile divine foreknowledge with libertarian human freedom. Hasker argues that if God had foreknowledge of a particular future choice, that choice cannot be free with libertarian freedom. I hold, to the contrary, that, given a certain theory of time—the view that all times exist equally—it is possible to reconcile divine foreknowledge with libertarian freedom. In a recent article, “Can Eternity be Saved? A Comment on Stump and Rogers”, Hasker makes it clear that one of the fundamental disagreements between us lies in what each of us takes to be required for libertarian free will. In the present paper I outline the version of libertarianism that I&nbsp;find plausible, then explain how a libertarian free choice can be foreknown by God. (I call my approach “Anselmian”, in that it is based on my interpretation of the work of St. Anselm of Canterbury.) Then I will explain why Hasker finds this reconciliation unacceptable since it fails to do justice to what he takes to be required for libertarian freedom. Finally, I will argue that Hasker is wrong to insist upon his analysis of free will.</p> Katherin Rogers Copyright (c) 2022 Roczniki Filozoficzne http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 70 1 79 89 10.18290/rf2201.5 The Openness of God: Hasker on Eternity and Free Will https://ojs.tnkul.pl/index.php/rf/article/view/17339 <p>The understanding of God’s mode of existence as eternal makes a significant difference to a&nbsp;variety of issues in contemporary philosophy of religion, including, for instance, the apparent incompatibility of divine omniscience with human freedom. But the concept has come under attack in current philosophical discussion as inefficacious to solve the philosophical puzzles for which it seems so promising. Although Boethius in the early 6th century thought that the concept could resolve the apparent incompatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will, some contemporary philosophers, such as William Hasker, have argued that whatever help the concept of eternity may give with that puzzle is more than vitiated by the religiously pernicious implications of the concept for notions of God’s providence and action in time. In this paper, I will examine and respond to Hasker’s arguments against the doctrine of God’s eternity.</p> Eleonore Stump Copyright (c) 2022 Roczniki Filozoficzne http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 70 1 91 106 10.18290/rf2201.6 Divine Causation and Analogy https://ojs.tnkul.pl/index.php/rf/article/view/17340 <p>Quentin Smith’s idea is that God being the originating cause of the universe is logically inconsistent with all extant definitions of causation, and thus&nbsp; logically impossible. Thus, for example&nbsp; the&nbsp; God of the Philosophers couldn’t have created the Universe, not&nbsp; even in both its senses, in both literal and analogical senses. The thesis is advanced by accounts of the usual views of “cause”. It is maintained these is successful. Such I shall then offer an account of divine causation of my own, and thus attempt to argue that Smith has not shown that the relation that God has to the universe is not a causal relation. Such as a Humean or that of&nbsp; David Lewis sense and of the “singularist” view of C. J. Ducasse would fail the analogical. And Malebranche’s “occasionalism” is surely an exception. If we turn to the other kind then&nbsp; it seems to be a case of “if the data are analogical-in, then the data will be that too”. Finally, it is argued that it is more productive to consider particular individual theistic powers and perfections, for these are mongrels which literality and of analogy are compounded.</p> Paul Helm Copyright (c) 2022 Roczniki Filozoficzne http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 70 1 107 120 10.18290/rf2201.7 A Bigger God and the Pre-Creation Situation: Some Remarks Inspired by William Hasker https://ojs.tnkul.pl/index.php/rf/article/view/17341 <p>In the present essay, while entering into discussion with William Hasker, I addressed two divine dilemmas in “the pre-creation situation.” My considerations focused on the reasons for creating a world—the love (grace) reason and the manifestation reason—which in some way prevailed over the reasons against creating a world (the no need reason and the imperfection reason) and whose concurrence prompted the image of an (rather relatively) optimal creatable world. It turns out that the latter resembles both our world and the world suggested by Hasker’s theism. In that world, God has brought to existence both what is unworthy (thus showing his grace in a special way) and what displays high degrees of excellence (thus manifesting his glory). On this view, the eschatological conclusion of the world would be the full actualization of divine grace and of the manifestation of God. In the final part of the essay, I attempted to show that my view does not entail the rejection of the idea of divine impassibility.</p> Jacek Wojtysiak Copyright (c) 2022 Roczniki Filozoficzne http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 70 1 121 136 10.18290/rf2201.8 Some Puzzles about Molinist Conditionals https://ojs.tnkul.pl/index.php/rf/article/view/17342 <p>William Hasker has been one of the most trenchant and insightful critics of the revival of Molinism. He has focused on the “freedom problem”, a set of challenges designed to show that Molinism does not secure a place for genuinely free human action (Hasker 1986, 1995, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2011). These challenges focus on a key element in the Molinist story: the counterfactual (or subjunctive) conditionals of creaturely freedom. According to Molinism, these conditionals have contingent truth-values that are knowable to God prior to His decision of what world to actualize. This divine “middle knowledge” is supposed to enable God to execute a detailed plan for world history without any loss of creaturely freedom. Hasker has argued that this middle knowledge nonetheless deprives us of the power to do otherwise than we do, a crucial element in human freedom and responsibility.</p> <p>I hope to accomplish three things in this paper. First, I want to step back a bit and explore the nature of the conditionals of creaturely free decision-making (the CCFs), bringing out some of the difficulties in delimiting their scope and nature. Second, I will explore the implications of different answers to an important question that has not been addressed in the literature: whether we have counterfactual power over the conditionals of divine freedom. And, third, I would like to recommend to Molinists a revision that offers a solution to the freedom problem.</p> Robert C. Koons Copyright (c) 2022 Roczniki Filozoficzne http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 70 1 137 154 10.18290/rf2201.9 On William Hasker’s Theodicy, the Doctrine of Continuous Creation and the Nature of Morality https://ojs.tnkul.pl/index.php/rf/article/view/17343 <p>In the article, I present the main assumptions of the natural-order theodicy and the free-will theodicy defended by William Hasker. Next, I pose the question of whether Hasker’s theodicies are compatible with the Christian doctrine of continuous creation accepted by Hasker himself. I&nbsp;consider several different ways of how the doctrine of continuous creation can be understood and the difficulties associated with them. Finally, I propose a modified conception of continuous creation and I claim that it is consistent with the main assumptions of William Hasker’s theodicies.</p> Dariusz Łukasiewicz Copyright (c) 2022 Roczniki Filozoficzne http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 70 1 155 171 10.18290/rf2201.10 A Neo-Lockean Theory of the Trinity and Incarnation https://ojs.tnkul.pl/index.php/rf/article/view/17344 <p>I present two problems: the logical problem of the Trinity and the metaphysical problem of Incarnation. I propose a solution to both problems: a Neo-Lockean theory of the Trinity and Incarnation, which applies a Neo-Lockean theory of personal identity to the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation.</p> Joseph Jedwab Copyright (c) 2022 Roczniki Filozoficzne http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 70 1 173 189 10.18290/rf2201.11 Reply to My Friendly Critics https://ojs.tnkul.pl/index.php/rf/article/view/17345 William Hasker Copyright (c) 2022 Roczniki Filozoficzne http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 70 1 191 223 10.18290/rf2201.12 William Hasker’s Bibliography https://ojs.tnkul.pl/index.php/rf/article/view/17346 William Hasker Copyright (c) 2022 Roczniki Filozoficzne http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 70 1 225 237 10.18290/rf2201.13