Are We Embodied Souls?
Abstrakt
It is argued that Swinburne should stress the functional unity of soul and body under most healthy conditions. Too often, critics of substance dualism charge dualists with promoting a problematic bifurcation between soul and body. Swinburne’s work is defended against objections from Thomas Nagel. It is argued that Swinburne’s appeal to the first-person point of view is sound.
Bibliografia
Monk, Ray. The Spirit of Solitude 1872–1921. New York: Free Press, 2016.
Nagel, Thomas. Review of Are We Bodies or Souls? by Richard Swinburne. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, no. 2020.04.07. https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/are-we-bodies-or-souls.
Swinburne, Richard. Are We Bodies or Souls? Oxford: OUP, 2019.
Taliaferro, Charles. “Substance Dualism: A Defense.” In The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, edited by Jonathan J. Loose, Angus J. L. Menuge, and J. P. Moreland (Oxford: Wiley–Blackwell, 2018), 43–60.
Taliaferro, Charles. “The Virtues of Embodiment.” Philosophy 76, no. 1 (2001): 111–25.
Taliaferro, Charles. Consciousness and the Mind of God. Cambridge: CUP, 1994.
Nagel, Thomas. Review of Are We Bodies or Souls? by Richard Swinburne. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, no. 2020.04.07. https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/are-we-bodies-or-souls.
Swinburne, Richard. Are We Bodies or Souls? Oxford: OUP, 2019.
Taliaferro, Charles. “Substance Dualism: A Defense.” In The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, edited by Jonathan J. Loose, Angus J. L. Menuge, and J. P. Moreland (Oxford: Wiley–Blackwell, 2018), 43–60.
Taliaferro, Charles. “The Virtues of Embodiment.” Philosophy 76, no. 1 (2001): 111–25.
Taliaferro, Charles. Consciousness and the Mind of God. Cambridge: CUP, 1994.
Opublikowane
2021-03-18
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