Knowability as De Re Modality: A Certain Solution to Fitch Paradox

Tomasz Jarmużek; Krzysztof Krawczyk; Rafał Palczewski

doi:10.18290/rf20684-14

Tomasz Jarmużek Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, Polska https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3456-3859
Krzysztof Krawczyk Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, Polska https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4367-4796
Rafał Palczewski Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, Polska

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf20684-14

Słowa kluczowe: antyrealizm, modalność de dicto, modalność de re, logika epistemiczna, paradoks Fitcha, logika poznawalności, zasada poznawalności, logika modalna, metody tablicowe

Abstrakt

Poznawalność jako modalność de re: pewne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha

W artykule staramy się znaleźć nowe, intuicyjne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha. Twierdzimy, że tradycyjne wyrażenie zasady poznawalności (p → ◊Kp) opiera się na błędnym rozumieniu poznawalności jako modalności de dicto. Zamiast tego proponujemy rozumieć poznawalność jako modalność de re. W artykule przedstawiamy minimalną logikę poznawalności, w której zasada poznawalności jest ważna, ale paradoks Fitcha już nie obowiązuje. Logikę charakteryzujemy semantycznie, a także poprzez podejście aksjomatyczne i tabelaryczne.

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