Sądy moralne jako konstytutywny element badania naukowego

Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik

Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, Wydział Filozofii

Słowa kluczowe: ideał nauki wolnej od wartości, nauka jako działanie, struktura badania naukowego, sądy wartościujące, nauki czyste i stosowane, sądy moralne, racjonalność praktyczna i instrumentalna

Abstrakt

The paper aims at answering the question of whether scientists qua scientists pass moral judgements. My answer is: “yes”. I claim that moral judgements are necessary for advancing science and that they may even belong to the content of science. This fact threatens neither rationality nor objectivity of science. On the contrary − pretending that science is morally neutral distorts it. I develop two arguments for my theses. First, against the background of the ideal of value-free science I show that value-judgements are constitutive for science. This ideal is not tenable when we consider science as human activity. By analyzing cases of research I then show that in applied sciences both methodological and moral judgements are necessary for any successful inquiry. The structure of scientific research allows me to extend this claim to science in general. Secondly, by considering science as governed by practical − not instrumental − rationality I show that moral judgements, which evaluate actions constitutive of any research as “permissible”, have their source in this rationality. Without them rationality, freedom, and autonomy of science are endangered.

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