O klasycznym pojęciu prawdy

Abstrakt

The article presents the state of contemporary debate on the three fundamental theories of truth: classical (correspondence), coherentionist and pragmatist ones. Also A. Tarski’s conception o f truth, D. Davidson’s views on truth and the so-called deflationist conceptions are discussed. The author tries to show what relations occur between the pre-theoretical understanding o f the concept of truth and the classical concept of truth. Also the relation between the nature of truth and philosophical scepticism is discussed as well as the question: do sciences and technologies based on them need the classical concept of truth in order to account for the explanatory, prognostic and technological success they achieve. The article also discusses the position of the so-called anti-realism postulating replacing the concept of truth with e.g. the concept of ideal verification or the concept of objectivity. The opposition is considered between fundationalism and coherentionism and in this context the author tries to formulate an answer to the question of what the debate on the criterion of truth is concerned with. The conclusions drawn from all these considerations are the following. Despite the various attempts at discrediting or rejecting it the classical concept of truth is in a good theoretical condition. All sceptical positions have to assume this concept in one or another way; also no semantic programmes presented up to now (A. Tarski, D. Davidson) have been able to eliminate the classical concept of truth. Science and technology assume both the concept of truth in the classical sense and the characteristics that are connected with it. The classical understanding o f truth should be then recognised as one that cannot be eliminated from our conceptual paradigm we use to think about the world. The article is concluded with considerations on the metaphysical background of the classical concept of truth. The author formulates the thesis that there is a close relationship between the classical conception of truth and the position taken by metaphysical rationalism. In this context R. Descartes', G. W. Leibniz’s and I. Kant’s vies are discussed.