Świadomość a problem redukcji

Abstrakt

The author discusses the question of reduction of consciousness. At the beginning she declares her externalistic and realistic position. Her externalism is seen through the nature of human action which demands both, intentionality and consciousness. But her argumentation against reduction of consciousness is made from an internalistic (not externalistic) point of view, and is supported by some results given by certain cognitive neuroscientists, like Susan Greenfield, for instance. In line with those neuroscientists she argues that consciousness (consisted in conscious states) is characterized by such features (like: spatial multiplicity, modality, single temporality) which in spite of their neuronal realizability, are not reducible. Another specific feature of consciousness (especially emphasized in philosophy by Kant and Husserl) is its ability to synthesize. In her consideration, the question of synthesis (contrary to Stanisław Judycki who used it in his argument against naturalistic conceptions of the mind) remains open.

To conclude, she defends a many-dimensional strategy of research and thinks that despite the continuity between the account of the mind and the natural world, there is a place for nonnaturalized epistemology in which our rich mental life can be also viewed in certain autonomy.