Zagadka naturalizmu

Stanisław Judycki

Stanisław Judycki Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, Wydział Filozofii

Słowa kluczowe: naturalizm, epistemologia, filozofia umysłu, teizm

Abstrakt

Naturalism is a philosophical doctrine assuming that all that exists is natural, that is, that there are no spiritual realities, no purely spiritual substances, no supernatural beings, transcendent in relation to the world. In epistemology it is said that no correct and convincing arguments can be formulated for existence of this kind of objects. The general thesis of naturalism is concerned with a discussion on theism and atheism, a discussion on the ontological status of the human mind, a discussion coming from the area of philosophy of biology, from the area of ethics and axiology, and even a discussion of the issue of how the objects of formal sciences exist. Naturalism is rather a conclusion from accumulation of arguments from various branches of knowledge than a self-dependent philosophical conviction. In the course of the considerations the following issues will be dealt with: historical background of naturalism, ontological and methodological naturalism, naturalism in axiology, epistemology, in social sciences and philosophy of the mind, relations between naturalism and physicalism, materialism, emergentism and functionalism.

Opponents of naturalism usually try to show that within one or another branch of knowledge naturalism cannot be maintained, and on this basis they assume that naturalism as awhole is false. In the present considerations a different method of anti-naturalist argumentation has been used, namely, a fictitious thesis has been accepted, that as result of future development of scientific knowledge naturalism in all the branches will be considered as a convincing point of view and will be generally accepted. The phrase „puzzle of naturalism” used in the title is supposed to suggest that even in such a situation the general thesis of naturalism will not result from acceptance of particular naturalisms in all branches of knowledge. In other words, conceivable complete explanative successes achieved in particular branches of knowledge will not give the right to draw a general naturalistic conclusion. Hence the thesis of auniversal naturalism will remain puzzling.

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