Czy filozofia analityczna sama sobie wykopała grób?

Abstrakt

Many contemporary philosophers, especially the “post-modern ones,” claim that analytical philosophy has committed self-destruction by undermining the position of cognitive realism and questioning its main pillars: theory of objective reference of expressions and correspondential theory of truth. One of such philosophers is Rorty, an indefatigable critic of the conception of “right representations,” a concept that – according to him – is “an empty compliment which we pay to helpful beliefs while realising our intentions.” In order to support his nihilistic position, Rorty many times refers to Quine. In my paper I seek to answer the question whether Rorty’s and the views of other post-modern philosophers can be supported by Quine’s philosophical conceptions. Analysing some selected trends of his philosophy, in particular the thesis about indeterminacy of reference (ontological relativity), I seek to prove that – contrary to Rorty’s claim – Quine did not devalue the idea of objective reference. I also prove that the semantic concept of truth as relativised to the model of language plays in Quine’s epistemology an equally essential role to the role of the immanent concept of truth as “disquotational.” The former is closer to the correspondential conception of truth. The conclusions which Rorty draws from the conception of Quine are rash, and sometimes they are an outcome of biased interpretation.