God and Chance

Keywords: chance events, causelessness, randomness, God, concurrentism, complementarity, middle knowledge, Molinism

Abstract

In the present paper, I analyse six concepts of a chance event (as defined by Dariusz Łukasiewicz) and also propose a definition of the term “random event.” Rejecting the existence of entirely causeless events, I discuss the relationship between random events and God. The view I formulate is based on three principles: the principle of simultaneous concurrence, the principle of complementarity, and the principle of middle knowledge (inspired by Luis de Molina). In adopting these three principles, I can reconcile the existence of God conceived in a classical manner, as Creator and Lord of all events, with the existence of random events. The model I propose provides an alternative to the conceptions offered by different currents of (more or less) revisionist (open) theism, including Łukasiewicz’s probabilistic theism.

Author Biography

Jacek Wojtysiak, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland

Jacek Wojtysiak, Prof. Dr Hab., Department of Theory of Knowledge, Faculty of Philosophy, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin

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Published
2020-10-01
Section
Articles