Późnoantyczne próby obalenia determinizmu: Aleksander z Afrodyzji i Chalcydiusz

Monika A. Komsta

Monika A. Komsta Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II, Wydział Filozofii

Słowa kluczowe: Aleksander z Afrodyzji, Chalcydiusz, przeznaczenie, determinizm, stoicyzm

Abstrakt

In this article the author analyses two polemics against the stoic conception of fate – by Alexander of Aphrodisias and by Chalcidius. Alexander, who wants to show the Aristotelian doctrine of fate, presents the subject against a background of the stoic conception, pointing out its disadvantages. He deals with the ideas concerning the existence and meaning of possibility in determinism. He also discusses issues referring to the free will of a man, free choices and their consequences. Chalcidius talks about the matters of evil and its beginnings, as he finds the stoics unable to give satisfactory answers to these questions. Not only similarities are there between Alexander and Chalcidius, but many differences as well. They are caused by the different backgrounds of the two critics of determinism. Alexander sees himself as an orthodox peripateticienne, whereas Chalcidius places his conceptions in the context of Platon’s teachings about fate.

Biogram autora

Monika A. Komsta, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II, Wydział Filozofii

Dr Monika A. Komsta – Katedra Historii Filozofii Starożytnej i Średniowiecznej na Wydziale Filozofii Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego Jana Pawła II

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