Problem doświadczenia na gruncie empiryzmu konstrukcyjnego
Abstrakt
Van Fraassen’s distinction between observable and non-observable objects and his pragmatic conception of observation is presented and discussed. There is already huge literature where constructive empiricism is criticized or defended. The critical argumentation focuses on inconsistencies between the observable/non-observable distinction and the principles of constructive empiricism. My main argument against Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism comes down to the thesis that contrary to what is declared by him it does not remove metaphysics from science but lets it to endure in the form of the theory of experience.
Bibliografia
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