Epistemological-Explanatory Dimension of the Problem of Non-Linguistic Thoughts according to José Luis Bermúdez

  • Anna Dutkowska The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy, PhD student
Keywords: Bermúdez; nonlinguistic thought; the content of non-linguistic thought; attribution non-linguistic thoughts

Abstract

Bermúdez considers the problem of non-linguistic thoughts on two dimensions: epistemological and explanatory. Epistemological dimension is how it is possible to assign thoughts to the non-linguistic creatures (hereinafter: NC) and whether it is possible to know the content of non-linguistic thought. To solve this problem Bermúdez applied success semantics to NC, which allows to know the contents of beliefs and desires and to use psychological explanation. The explanatory dimension relates to the attribution of thought to NC, which would explain their behavior. For this purpose, Bermúdez extends the concept of rationality to NC by highlighting its different levels. In addition, he extracts protologic to show how practical reasoning may be assigned to the NC. The main complaints to his position are related to following factors: the relationship between thinking and reasoning, the methodology which is used by Bermúdez and expanded concept of rationality.

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Published
2020-06-16
Section
Articles