An Actual-Sequence Theology

John Martin Fischer

doi:10.18290/rf2201.4

John Martin Fischer University of California, USA

Keywords: theology, free will, freedom to do otherwise, acting freely, regulative control, guidance control, Open Theism, Problem of Evil, William Hasker

Abstract

In this paper I develop a sketch of an overall theology that dispenses with “alternative-possibilities” freedom in favor of “actual-sequence” freedom. I hold that acting freely does not require freedom to do otherwise, and that acting freely is the freedom component of moral responsibility. Employing this analytical apparatus, I show how we can offer various important elements of a theology that employs only the notion of acting freely. I distinguish my approach from the important development of Open Theism by William Hasker. My view about God’s foreknowledge is in-between comprehensive foreknowledge and no foreknowledge (Open Theism).

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