The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories
(trans. Marcin Iwanicki and Joanna Klara Teske)
Abstract
The author argues that the moral of the Frankfurt stories is this: if causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, it is not in virtue of eliminating alternative possibilities, and replies the most important challenge to this claim, namely an argument called “The Dilemma Defense.”
Information about the Translators:
Marcin Iwanicki, PhD — The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of the History of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy;
Dr. habil. Joanna Klara Teske, Associate Professor at KUL — The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Humanities, Institute of Literary Studies, Department of English Literature and Culture.
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