Epistemic values: Some contemporary controversies in the axiology of science

Abstract

The paper discusses naturalistic axiology of L. Laudan (normative naturalism) and social epistemology of H. Longino (contextual empiricism). Both standpoints are subjected to criticism. G.Doppelt, A.Rosenberg, and H.Siegel argue that Laudan's axiology lacks any naturalistic foundation. K.Freedman shows that this objection is based on a misunderstanding of Laudan's use of the term “naturalism”. He distinguishes two senses of this term running throughout Laudan's work. Once those senses are made explicit the above objection dissappears.

Next, the attention is drawn to the virtues of Longino's epistemology as a viable alternative both to positivism and holism. The paper presents objections raised by Ph. Kitcher (the charge of relativism), F.Schmitt (the charge of incoherence) and M.Solomon (the charge of individualism) against Longino's views and arguments defending her position developed by K. B. Wray.

The paper claims that the discussions presented can be best understood within the framework of (epistemic) axiology initiated in the fifties of the XX^th century – among others – by R. Rudner, C.W.Churchman, I.Levi.