Architecture of Consciousness. Part Three: The Will and Sense of Existence
Abstract
In the part three, motivations in the form of pain and pleasure for activity of intelligent autonomous system was discussed. It was also shown, that another kind of motivations in the form of curiosity and understanding instinct is necessary for advanced conscious state formation. Neural substrate for this motivations was indicated. Complex conscious mind model was proposed omnirelevant to all levels of information processing. The model explains major human psyche features. The sources of self-awareness and contemplative consciousness was shown and also described how the sense and goal of existence is formulated. It explains the way how free will can appear and how the mind can work effectively for self-interest and for favor of consciousness embedded in neural modeling fields. It was described how the understanding need and harmony necessity can create the good and another ethic value. How the mind driving emotions can generate empathy and altruism feelings. The model shows, that for all these functions, for learning what is good and moral, the body equipped with both, perception and impact on surrounding is necessary. This is direct evidence that unification of the soul and body is necessary for intentionally moral, self-aware being existence.
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