Kiedy potrzeba domknięcia sprzyja złożonemu poznaniu

  • Paweł Strojny Jagiellonian University, Institute of Psychology
  • Małgorzata Kossowska Jagiellonian University, Institute of Psychology
  • Agnieszka Strojny Jagiellonian University, Institute of Psychology
Keywords: potrzeba domknięcia; strategia poznawcza; sądy społeczne; formowanie wiedzy; przetwarzanie informacji

Abstract

Teoria naiwnego poznania jest jednym z najbardziej wpływowych podejść opisujących proces nabywania wiedzy. Zgodnie z nią o przebiegu procesu epistemicznego decyduje w pierwszej kolejności motywacja do uzyskania domknięcia poznawczego. W większości przypadków duże natężenie tej motywacji wiąże się z uproszczonym i przyspieszonym przetwarzaniem informacji. Fakt ten może prowadzić do nadmiernie uproszczonego rozumienia tej zmiennej. W rzeczywistości istnieją przesłanki do twierdzenia, że w pewnych okolicznościach typowa zależność ulega odwróceniu. Artykuł zawiera przegląd badań potwierdzających to przewidywanie. Wyniki przeanalizowano ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem dwóch postulatów teorii: dwóch faz procesu epistemicznego i dwoistej natury potrzeby poznawczego domknięcia.

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Published
2019-04-05
Section
Articles