Justice and Porposefulness in Law

  • Jadwiga Potrzeszcz Catholic University of Lublin
Keywords: idea of law; justice; purposefulness; security of law; values of law; idea of the values

Abstract

In the article an attempt is undertaken at defining mutual relations of justice and purposefulness, as the values that form the idea of law. The conception of the idea of law was worked out mainly by the German philosophy of law, and especially by G. Radbruch and A. Kaufmann.

In the idea of law G. Radbruch distinguished three elements: justice, purposefulness and reliability of law. Justice is a formal principle whose essence is equality. It just defines the form of law, requiring that the equal should be treated equally and the unequal differently in an adequate way. To complement this principle purposefulness is necessary, which is a material principle defining the contents of law. However, since it is connected with relativism and controversies may originate of the political-worldview nature concerning the contents of law, also the principle of reliability of law is necessary that can put an end to these controversies and bring about legal peace, securing the binding force for the positive law. Between these three elements of the idea of law, according to Radbuch, there is a relation of mutual exclusion.

A. Kaufmann developed the theory of the idea of law. His point of departure was the fact that as equality is the essence of justice, then equality itself is not the whole of justice. There are other tendencies beside it, namely, purposefulness and security of law. He identified the idea of law with a broadly understood justice that may be considered in three aspects: in the aspect of justice as equality, in the aspect of justice as purposefulness and in the aspect of justice as a factor giving security of law.

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Published
2019-11-13
Section
Articles