Meritocratic Justification in Rulemaking and its Criticism Based on the Example of American Regulatory Agencies
Abstract
Mertitocracy, in the intention of the author of this concept Michael Young, meant entrusting the exercise of power over specific areas of social life to people with appropriate skills and competence. The implementation of meritocratic assumptions in social reality was to create a system where experts were to play a key role in managing social life. This postulate also referred to creating regulations for selected areas of social life, which should be entrusted to specialized, professional entities. The Author discusses the importance and role of meritocratic justification for legislation on the example of US independent regulatory agencies. This justification has a twofold role: 1) as a factor legitimizing the shape of the introduced regulations and 2) as a camouflage for the implementation of the interests of the agencies themselves or of specific pressure groups or group of interests.
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