Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem (trans. Krzysztof Nowicki)
Abstract
Original: "Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem", Analysis 60 (2000), issue 2: 143-147. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/60.2.143. Translation with permission of the author.
In addition to being uncertain about what the world is like, one can also be uncertain about one’s own spatial or temporal location in the world. The aim of the paper is to pose a problem arising from the interaction between these two sorts of uncertainty, solve the problem, and draw two lessons from the solution.
References
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