Evaluative and Existential Aspects of Moral Luck
Abstract
The phenomenon of luck poses a problem for ethics for two reasons. First, it makes it difficult to formulate homogeneous moral judgments for two or more actions which seem to be similar to each other in every morally relevant aspect except of some successful or unfortunate events that take place in one case and not in the other. The occurrence of these events wasn’t under control of any of the agents but for external observers it tends to be the basis for more rigorous or more tolerant moral judgment in one case and not in the other. Second, luck can affect our sense of life through success or failure of ours existentially important life projects. This fact suggests necessity of conditions for morally permissible relying on luck in formulating and pursuing one’s life project. In this paper I present possibilities of applying main views on luck to resolve the above problems.
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