Swinburne’s Are We Bodies or Souls?

William Hasker

doi:10.18290/rf21691-7

William Hasker Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Huntington University, USA https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9892-3633

Keywords: Swinburne, dualism, emergence, soul, thisness

Abstract

Richard Swinburne’s Are We Bodies or Souls? presents a sustained case for a view concerning the nature of persons that can be classified as a form of either Cartesian dualism or emergent dualism. This paper comments on two important arguments developed in the book and concludes by considering the problem of the origin of souls.

References

Hasker, William. The Emergent Self. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.

Swinburne, Richard. “Cartesian Substance Dualism.” In The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, edited by Jonathan Loose, Angus Menuge, and J. P. Moreland, 133–51. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2018.

Swinburne, Richard. Are We Bodies or Souls? Oxford: OUP, 2019.

Swinburne, Richard. Mind, Brain, and Free Will. Oxford: OUP, 2013.

Swinburne, Richard. The Evolution of the Soul. Oxford: OUP, 1986.