Descartes, Kant, and Swinburne on Human Soul

Keywords: soul, synthetic a priori knowledge, Kant, empirical and intelligible character

Abstract

This paper addresses two issues in Richard Swinburne’s book Are We Bodies or Souls? I interpret Swinburne’s modal argument as an example of a priori synthetic knowledge. Swinburne’s thesis that every person possesses “thisness” is compared with Kant’s distinction between the empirical character and the intelligible character.

Author Biography

Stanisław Judycki, University of Gdańsk

Stanisław Judycki, Prof. Dr Hab., Head of the Department of Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion and Contemporary Philosophy in the Institute of Philosophy, University of Gdańsk

References

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Descartes, René. The Meditations and Selections from the Principles of René Descartes. Translated by John Veitch. Chicago: Open Court, 1903.

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Swinburne, Richard. Are We Bodies or Souls? Oxford: OUP, 2019.

Published
2021-03-18
Section
Articles