The Revival of Substance Dualism

Keywords: Swinburne, dualism, personal identity, epiphenomenalism


I argue in this essay that Richard Swinburne’s revised version of Descartes’ argument in chapter 5 of his Are We Bodies or Souls? does not quite get him to the conclusion that he requires, but that a modified version of his treatment of personal identity will do the trick. I will also look critically at his argument against epiphenomenalism, where, once again, I share his conclusion but have reservations about the argument.

Author Biography

Howard Robinson, Central European University, Austria

Howard Robinson, University Professor of Philosophy at the Central European University


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