Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility

(trans. Marcin Iwanicki and Joanna Klara Teske)

Keywords: free will, moral responsibility, reason-responsiveness


The author presents a model of moral responsibility based on the actual sequence and the notion of reason-responsiveness, and draws an analogy between this model and Robert Nozick’s model of knowledge based on the actual sequence. In addition, the concept of semicompatibilism is introduced and explained.

Information about the Translators:
Marcin Iwanicki, PhD — The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of the History of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy;

Dr. habil. Joanna Klara Teske, Associate Professor at KUL — The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Humanities, Institute of Literary Studies, Department of English Literature and Culture.


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