The Subject Matter of Formal Logic according to Józef M. Bocheński

Abstract

Aristotle, the founder of formal logic, did not describe the subject matter of that discipline. During twenty or so centuries the subject matter has been defined in many ways. The paper depicts J. M. Bochenski’s standpoints, as they are included in one of his works, dealing with the subject matter of formal logic. Furthermore, aside to ordering Bochenski’s theses as regards the problems in question, the paper seeks to supplement, modify and make more profound the formulations in the analyzed text. In conclusion, the paper claims that classical (standard) logic is not a theory of any objects, as Bocheński put it, but a theory of some relationships that obtain between any objects (entities) which may be designates of the names or denotations of the positive propositions. That type of relationships are formulated in the laws of logic.