The Existential Judgment and Cognition of Existence (The Analysis of the Views of F. Brentano and M. A. Krąpiec)

Abstract

The article analyses the views of F. Brentano and M. A. Krąpiec on existential judgement. The analysis consists of five parts: In the first part the role and function of immediate cognition is presented; then there is taken into consideration the structure of existential judgement; thirdly there is made a description of the subject of existential judgement; the forth part deals with the deference betweem affirmation and assertion; in the last part there is analysed existential judgement of the self.

In result of the analysis there have been discovered eight important differences between Bren­tano and Krąpiec. And these are a few of them: (a) In Brentano's view the existential judgement is precedent by presentation whereas in Krąpiec view it is not. (b) According to Krąpiec existen­tial judgement has got its own object while according to Brentano its object is identical with the object of presentation. (c) Unity of existential judgement (lack of division and composition) according to Brentano is based on the unity act of cognition and according to Krąpiec the unity is result of unity of the object.