P. K. Feyerabend's Praktical Relativism

Abstract

The article presents P. K. Feyerabend's concept of relativism. Three aspects of this question may be distinquished: epistemological, methodological and ontological.

The first aspect which is called „practical relativism” appears not to be completely consistent. The Author wants it to be a political idea, but at the same time he sets it against the epistemological one namely: against the objectivism.

The second, methodological aspect of the P. K. Feyerabend's relativism is connected with the so called separability assumption. (The acceptance of this principle is indispensable if the objectivity of science is to be maintained).

The ontological relativism − the third aspect of the discussed question is closely connected with the Feyerabend's thesis of incommensurability. There is some inconsistency: the pluralistic methaphisics which is the essence of that kind of relativism is inconsistent with the monistic materialism which is assumed in other Feyerabend's arguments.