Identificatory and Ontological Dependencies

Abstract

Strawson in his descriptive metaphysics accepts the principle that identificatory dependencies give adequate grounds for establishing ontological dependencies. According to some thinkers the inference from identificatory priorities to ontological priorities can be valid only under such a redefinition of this latter notion that it loses all connections with its traditional counterpart. In the article − after an introductory account of identification − the thesis is defended that although Strawson's notion of ontological priority is not identical in all respects with the traditional notion of ontological priority, it still have with the latter some essential connections sine it also concerns the domain of that what really exists. These connections are preserved in virtue of the fact that in order to state any meaningful ontological claim, that is to state that an item (or a class of objects) exists, we must refer to that item, and this reference, in turn, is impossible without the identification of that item. The differences between Strawsonian and traditional notion of ontological priority arise because not always the order of identificatory priorities must be the same as the order of ontological priorities, i.e. not always the necessary conditions of  accepting that something exists are identical with the necessary conditions that something exists.