The Genesis of Scientific Theories: a Modern Form of the Controversy over Methodology Pluralism

Abstract

The main topic of this paper is embraced by the post-positivistic criticism of the empiricist approach to the philosophy of science. A special stress on the pluralism of the (meta-)methodology is laid down. On the second level we have distinguished the following two main kinds of metascientific discourse: methodology of appraisal or evaluation vs methodology of invention or discvovery. In opposition to the traditional dichotomy of the well known two contexts we do not exclude some kind of relevance between these two sorts of metascientifc inquiry. Four groups of reasons being involved in an attempt to exclude therationalizability process of invention are then critically discussed. These four types of arguments against such a possibility of scientific heuristics (methodology of theory construction) appeal to 1)intuition, chance or unexplainability, 2) induction, 3) T-terms, and 4) predictability.

Previously to this critical analysis of the arguments some attention upon preparatory issues is given. Such a role play especially: the status of methodology, historical approaches to the methodology of theory construction and rational reconstruction of the context of invention.