Introspection as a philosophical problem
Abstract
In its first half the article presents the main assumptions of the traditional (so-called Cartesian) theory of introspection. Among others (1) privileged access, (2) undoubtfulness of introspective data, (3) privacy of introspective data, (4) proposition that introspection is a separate act of consciousness, (5) proposition that introspection is a kind of inner perception, (6) proposition that introspection is concerned with what is going on in the consciousness at the moment, (7) proposition that introspective data may be the basis for knowledge about the outer world (fundationalism) belong to them. In the part concerned with behaviourism the main assumptions of scientific (methodological) behaviourism and of philosophical (logical) behaviourism are presented. The author accepts the main point of the criticism directed at the project of G. Ryle's philosophical behaviourism. He maintains the charge that the behaviourist approach to mentality does not allow one to talk about various kinds of mental states. In the part concerning the structure of introspection stress is laid on the role of attention. With the help of the idea of modification of attention the author tries to dismiss the charge that performing a definite act and at the same time introspectively defining it is impossible. With the use of the idea of attention he also shows how it is possible to oppose the objection of continuing acts of introspection into infinity and the charge that introspection modifies its object. Also the issues of infallibility and of completeness of introspective data in the light of certain experimental data and theoretical hypotheses (e.g. blindsight, psychoanalysis, N.Chomsky's theory of the language) are discussed. The last part concerns the problem of the relation between the ideas of introspection and unconsciousness. 'Unconsciousness' in the strong sense means a certain kind of conditioning to which human mind may be subjected. This conditioning is not only actually unconscious, but by its nature is unrealisable in the normal introspective way. Various ideas of unconsciousness are analysed: unconsciousness as what can be called to mind, unconscious habitual knowledge, unconsciousness in the psychoanalytical interpretation, unconsciousness as conditioning by the so-called computative mind. The author shows that the autonomy of the 'I' given in introspection is something peculiar and as such cannot be reduced to any kind of unconscious conditioning.
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