An Attempt to Look at Causality in the Characteristics of Mental Events. Does a Theory of the Mind Naturalize?

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to answer the question of how to understand causality in the account of mental events. In my approach, which is many-dimensional, an event plays a role of a cause in the set of causal circumstances (where a cause is treated physically, not conceptually, and is realized in different causal chains).

From my many-dimensional point of view, I propose three groups of definitions for different kinds of determinations: (1) for causal determinations, (2) for causal determinations which are enriched by non-causal ones, and (3) for non-causal determinations.

These definitions should be applicable to diferent kinds of systems, including artificial ones, as well as to various philosophical approaches to the mind. My strategy of inquires seems to be similar to Fodor's taxonomy of research, but in contrary to Fodor, my hierarchy of levels is not only purely structural, but also depends on the place of a given state in the system. My key question is here, whether a description (and explanation) given at the higher level (here: a psychological desciption) is in some way compatible with a description (and explanation) from the lower level (which belongs to neuroscience). My many-dimensional approach, in spite of some objections, should be fruitful because it is able to establish common ground between cognitive scientists and those philosophers who still defend their traditional domains of research and who don't want to allow for its particularization. In this way I try to defend a theory of the mind against the radical naturalization.