On Informal Logic

Abstract

In the article an attempt is undertaken to answer the following questions: What problems are tackled by authors who want to be considered as representatives of informal logic? Is there a connection between formal and informal logic? A number of research tasks and subjects are presented that may find themselves in the field of investigations conducted on the ground of informal logic. It is stressed that at the present stage of development of this logic it is difficult to precisely separate the problems that are withing its range. Also, informal logic is not fully recognized as a scientific discipline. In the article the problem of the nature of erroneous inferences and of their typology is comprehensively covered. A lot of attention is paid to the problem of interpretation and appraisal of arguments taken from everyday language. It is noted that among those authors who write on informal logic some think that use should be made of methods and procedures worked out in formal logic, and some treat ascribing value to formal logical rules as a form of pedantry and love of generality, and at the same time as underestimation of language variety. It is shown that use of logical paradigms of inference worked out in formal logic is no form of pedantry. Infallibility of such paradigms is guaranteed by implication rules of logic that state objective relations between states of things. In the article also the thesis is formulated that practical logic is first of all the well-developed and lectured formal logic, including the contemporary non-classical logics.