Some Philosophical Problems of Logics of Belief Change

Abstract

The article presents some problems of logical representation of belief change. The problem of beliefs (approached in a synchronic way) was analyzed on the ground of epistemic or intuitionist logics. In the 1980’s works concerning logical reconstruction of belief change appeared. The basic conception here is the conception of belief change formulated by C. Alchouron, P. Gärdenfors and D. Makinson (abbreviated as AGM), based on the assumption that the belief state is represented by a non-contradictory set of propositions and that a belief change should be minimal (the postulate of economy). However, the AGM theory, characterized by a good formal shape, gives rise to several problems of the intuitive nature. Some of them are: the way the object of beliefs is understood, logical value of propositions that induce a change, the propositional way of representing beliefs, putting beliefs in an order and the way this order is formally represented.