Formulation of Scientific Problems and Theoretization of Empirical Data
Abstract
The purpose of the present article is to propose a research project which will analyse the issue of theoretization of empirical data which takes place in the process of formulating scientific problems. J. Hintikka’s interrogative model of inquiry will serve us as a starting point for our considerations. First, his proposal of viewing the theory-dependence of facts will be characterized. Then, with reference to the results of K. Jodkowski, three interpretations of theory-laden thesis will be given: a radical, a modest and a weak one. This will render it possible to further develop a critique of certain aspects of Hintikka’s conception. Subsequently, the critique will provide a basis for presenting a new way of viewing theory-dependence of empirical data. Some considerations regarding a possible use of the received conceptual scheme for analyzing certain problems of philosophy of science will close the article. A possibility of analyzing such classical problems as falsification and the use of the principle of auto-determinacy in science will also be offered. Lastly, with reference to A. Grobler’s analyses, a possibility of representing a process of rejecting metaphysical presuppositions in science will be considered.
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