Alvin Plantinga’s Evolution Argument against Naturalism
Abstract
In the article the proposition is put forward that naturalism connected with evolutionism is an attitude involved in many problems, and the rationality of the naturalist attitude is not credible. The proposition is proven on the basis of the evolution argument against the form of naturalism that assumes that evolution theories are true, which was formulated by Alvin Plantinga. In the article it is shown that the naturalist explanation of human cognitive mechanisms is self-refuting. The naturalist claims that man’s cognitive system originated by way of evolutionary processes, and the aim of these processes is man’s survival, and not the truth of his beliefs; hence – on the basis of such reasoning – one may doubt if all beliefs are true, including the naturalist one. Hence in the article it is shown that the naturalist’s all beliefs, and among them the belief that ‘God does not exist’, cannot be credible. An indirect aim of the evolution argument against naturalism is also intellectual defense of credibility of the theist image of the world.
The starting point of the article is presentation of the argument that half a century earlier was formulated by Clive Staples Lewis. Next the details of Plantinga’s argumentation and controversies connected with it are shown. In the final part of the article the relation between naturalism and theism is discussed. In conclusion it is stated that the naturalist attitude does not attain what is required, so that a naturalist could state that it is the way he thinks; and this is why he is not able to threaten Christian theism.
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