Chance or Agency? A Response to “Divine Providence and Chance in the World”

Peter Forrest

doi:10.18290/rf20683-5

Peter Forrest University of New England, Australia https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5575-0664

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf20683-5

Keywords: Dariusz Łukasiewicz, chance, agency, providence, anthropomorphism, univocity

Abstract

Dariusz Łukasiewicz distinguishes six concepts of chance, some (C3, C5, C6) but not others (C1, C2, C4) compatible with human freedom in the robust (“libertarian”) sense. In this paper, I argue in two ways that theists should reject ontological chance (C1) and rely instead on irreducible agency when considering events that are providentially not predestined by God. My arguments depend on a univocal understanding of the assertions that God is a loving agent and that, at their best, human beings are loving agents. Implicit in Łukasiewicz’s paper, is the objection that this an improper anthropomorphism. I am an unashamed anthropomorphist and will defend univocity.

Author Biography

Peter Forrest, University of New England, Australia

Peter Forrest is Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Humanities, Arts, Social Sciences and Education, University of New England, Australia

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