The “Hard” Problem of Metaphysical Realism and Contemporary Anti- Realism
Abstract
The aim of the article is to consider the problem of metaphysical realism that is defined as the thesis that there are objects that are independent of human consciousness. The problem was not solved by I. Kant, since he assumed, without a justification, that there are objects (“things in themselves”) that are the causes of human mental states. The author interprets the problem of metaphysical realism in the context of the so-called principle of immanence (“principle of consciousness”), according to which every entity (object) may be treated exclusively as a correlate of consciousness. The principle of immanence is the cause why even causal relations have to be treated as only certain data for the consciousness, and hence they may not be referred to by asserting that there is a factor that is the cause of states of human consciousness. Contemporary anti-realism, as the so-called conceptual realism, does not consider the problem of metaphysical realism in the context of the principle of immanence, and hence it is not a part of the traditional dispute on the existence of the (external) world. The author sees the solution to the problem of metaphysical realism in combining two arguments: in the reference to the ontological proof, which – via God’s veracity – is to “lead outside” the immanence of consciousness, and in the reference to the concept of participation in such a way that the human mind participates in God and it is Him that is the real entity (ens realissimum) that is referred to by the dispute about the existence of the world and the problem of metaphysical realism.
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