David Chalmers’ Argument for the Logical Possibility of Zombies
Abstract
This paper presents a reconstruction of the argument for the logical possibility of zombies, proposed by David Chalmers, which has been debated in analytical philosophy for at least fifteen years now. Beside discussing it, I’m trying to analyze every of its premises. My aim is, especially, to present how the reasoning can show that: (a) zombies/zombie worlds are genuinely conceivable; (b) conceivability is a good guide to possibility; (c) the possibility of zombies is philosophically significant. I’m particularly putting emphasis on some issues concerning two-dimensional semantics and distinctions of conceivability. The conclusion of this paper is that the argument is still not refuted, so a discussion over it should be conducted, instead of a priori refutation. The debate over zombies may have a positive influence on many fields of philosophical investigation.
References
Aydede M., Güzeldere G., 2001: Consciousness, conceivability arguments, and perspectivalism: The dialectics of the debate, „Communication and Cognition” 34 (1-2), s. 99-122.
Balog K., 1999: Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem, „Philosophical Review” 108 (4), s. 497-528.
Bealer G., 2002: Modal epistemology and the rationalist renaissance, [w:] T. Gendler, J. Hawthorne (red.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press, s. 71-126.
Botterell A., 2001: Conceiving What Is Not There, “Journal of Consciousness Studies” 8 (1), s. 21-42.
Campbell K., 1970: Body and Mind, London: Doubleday.
Chalmers D., 1995a: Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, „Journal of Consciousness Studies” 2 (3), s. 200-219.
Chalmers D., 1995b: The Puzzle of Conscious Experience, „Scientific American” 237 (12), s. 62-68.
Chalmers D., 1996: The Consciouss Mind. In search of a Fundamental Theory, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers D., 1997: Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness, „Journal of Consciousness Studies” 4 (1), s. 3-46.
Chalmers D., 1999: Materialism and the metaphysics of modality, „Philosophy and Phenomenological Research” 59 (2), s. 473-493.
Chalmers D., 2002a: Consciousness and its place in nature, [w:] D. Chalmers (red.), Philosophy of Mind. Classical and contemporary readings, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, s. 247-272.
Chalmers D., 2002b: Does conceivability entail possibility?, [w:] T. Gendler, J. Hawthorne (red.), Conceivability and Possibility, New York–Oxford: Oxford University Press, s. 145-200.
Chalmers D., 2004: Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics, „Philosophical Studies” 188 (1-2), s. 153-226.
Chalmers D., 2006a: Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap, [w:] T. Alter, S. Walter (red.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press, s. 167-194.
Chalmers D., 2006b: Two-Dimensional Semantics, [w:] E. Lepore, B. Smith (red.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press, s. 574-606.
Chalmers D., 2009: The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism, [w:] B. McLaughlin (red.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers D., 2010a: Świadomy umysł. W poszukiwaniu teorii fundamentalnej, tł. M. Miłkowski, Warszawa: PWN.
Chalmers D., 2010b: The Character of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ciecierski T., 2003: O objaśnianiu pojęcia świadomości fenomenalnej, „Przegląd Filozoficzno-literacki” 4(6), s. 33-47.
Dennett D., 1995: The unimagined preposterousness of zombies, „Journal of Consciousness Studies” 2 (4), s. 322-326.
Dennett D., 2007: Słodkie sny. Filozoficzne przeszkody na drodze do nauki o świadomości, tł. M. Miłkowski, Warszawa: Prószyński i s-ka.
Dietrich E., Gillies A., 2001: Consciousness and the limits of our imaginations, „Synthese” 126 (3), s. 361-381.
Geirsson H., 2005: Conceivability and defeasible modal justification, „Philosophical Studies” 122 (2), s. 279-304.
Güzeldere G., 1995: Varieties of zombiehood, „Journal of Consciousness Studies” 4 (2), s. 326-333.
Hawthorne J., 2002: Advice for physicalists, „Philosophical Studies” 109 (1), s. 17-52.
Horowitz A., 2009: Turning the zombie on its head, „Synthese” 170 (2), s. 191-210.
Hume D., 2005: Traktat o naturze ludzkiej, tł. Cz. Znamierowski, Warszawa: Aletheia.
Huxley T., 2002: On the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata, and Its History, [w:] D. Chalmers (red.), Philosophy of Mind. Classical and contemporary readings, New York– Oxford: Oxford University Press, s. 24-31.
Ismael J., 1999: Science and the phenomenal, „Philosophy of Science” 66 (3), s. 351-369.
Jackson F., 1982: Epiphenomenal qualia, „Philosophical Quarterly” 32 (1), s. 127-136.
Kartezjusz, 2001: Medytacje o pierwszej filozofii, tł. K. i M. Ajdukiewiczowie, Kęty: Antyk.
Kirk R., 1974, Zombies vs. materialists, „Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society” 48 (supl.), s. 135-152.
Kirk R., 2005: Zombies and Consciousness, New York–Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kirk R., Online, Zombies, [w:] E. Zalta (red.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/
Kripke S., 1988: Nazywanie a konieczność, tł. B. Chwedeńczuk, Warszawa: IW PAX.
Kuś K., 2011: Wyobrażenia obrazowe jako świadectwa na rzecz przekonań modalnych, „Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria” 79 (3), s. 231-253.
Leuenberger S., 2008: Ceteris Absentibus Physicalism, „Oxford Studies in Metaphysics” 4, s. 145-170.
Levine J., 1983: Materialism and qualia. The explanatory gap, „Pacific Philosophical Quarterly” 64 (2), s. 354-361.
Miłkowski M., 2011: Jak udawać dualistę wprowadzając epicykle do funkcjonalizmu, „Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria” 77 (1), 27-45.
Moody T., 1994: Conversations with zombies, „Journal of Consciousness Studies” 1 (2), s. 196-200.
Nagel T., 1974: What is it like to be a bat?, „The Philosophical Review” 83 (4), s. 435-450.
Perry J., 2001: Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford MIT.
Poczobut R., 2009: Między redukcją a emergencją, Wrocław: FNP.
Polcyn K., 2010: W kwestii związku pomiędzy filozofią umysłu a naukami empirycznymi, [w:] Z. Muszyński (red.), Umysł. Natura i sposób istnienia. Trzy debaty, Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, s. 135-137.
Putnam H., 2002a: Brains and Behavior, [w:] D. Chalmers (red.), Philosophy of Mind. Classical and contemporary readings, New York–Oxford: Oxford University Press, s. 45-55.
Putnam H., 2002b: The meaning of „meaning”, [w:] D. Chalmers (red.), Philosophy of Mind. Classical and contemporary readings, New York–Oxford: Oxford University Press, s. 581-597
Stoljar D., 2001, The conceivability argument and two conceptions of the physical, „Philosophical Perspectives” 15 (2), s. 393-413.
Stout F., 1931: Mind and Matter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
van Cleve J., 1983: Conceivability and the Cartesian argument for dualism, „Pacific Philosophical Quarterly” 64 (1), s. 35-45.
van Inwagen P., 1979, Review of The Coherence of Theism, by R. Swinburne, „The Philosophical Review” 87 (4), s. 668-670.
van Inwagen P., 1998: Modal Epistemology, „Philosophical Studies” 92 (1), s. 67-84.
Worley S., 2003: Conceivability, possibility and physicalism, „Analysis” 63 (1), s. 15-23.
Yablo S., 1993: Is conceivability a guide to possibility?, „Philosophy and Phenomenological Research” 53 (4), s. 1-42.
Copyright (c) 2013 Roczniki Filozoficzne
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
