On Some Problems of Naturalizing the Philosophy of Science Exemplified on the Controversy about Realism

  • Paweł Zeider Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Institute of Philosophy
Keywords: methodological naturalism; philosophical interpretation of scientific facts; realism-antirealism controversy; abductive reasoning; success of science; convergent realism; Natural Ontological Attitude

Abstract

The main purpose of the paper is analysis of some problems referred to methodological understanding of the process to naturalize philosophy of science. This process can be considered as justification of philosophical thesis by scientific facts, and also as application of the methods of justification, which are effective in natural sciences, to philosophy of science. These procedures are often called philosophical interpretation of scientific facts, and their methodological validity is taken under consideration. This problem is analysed on the two examples, which are related to realism-antirealism controversy. One of them is the final argument for scientific realism. The second is the Arthur Fine’s Natural Ontological Attitudes.

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Published
2020-06-09
Section
Articles