Czym jest „epistemologia znaturalizowana”?

(transl. Marcin Garbowski)

  • Jaegwon Kim Brown University, Professor emeritus
Keywords: Willard V. Quine; epistemology; naturalism; justification; psychologism; normativity


Jaegwon Kim in his article undertakes a critical analysis of W.V. Quine’s “Epistemology Naturalized.” He states that it is impossible to practice epistemology without taking into consideration the normative aspect, for without it, it becomes reduced to merely a psychological description of cognitive processes. In order to speak of the acquisition of undoubtable knowledge, it is necessary to avert to such categories as justification, which are of an axiological nature. Kim considers Quine’s concept difficult to accept in accordance with any epistemic theory which requires truth as the object of knowledge.


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