Physicalist Panpsychism (przeł. Jacek Jarocki)

  • Galen Strawson Department of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin
  • Jacek Jarocki Department of the History of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin
Keywords: panpsychism; physicalism; materialism; philosophy of mind

Abstract

Original: Galen Strawson, "Physicalist Panpsychism", in: The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Second Edition, edited by Susan Schneider and Max Velmans (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2017), 374-390. Translation with permission of the author.

Rougly speaking, panpsychism is the view, that everything is mind or have consciousness. Although the view has a long and venerable tradition, and becomes more and more popular in the contemporary debate, it still has many opponents. The aim of this article is to prove that panpsychism is the best metaphysical account of the nature of the ultimate stuff of reality. At the same time, it is a kind of physicalism, according to which experience (experientiality) is the fundamental stuff of all concrete objects.

Author Biography

Jacek Jarocki, Department of the History of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin

PhD student

Published
2019-03-22
Section
Translations