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THE IMMIGRANT AS A NOT-INVENTED “OTHER”

INTRODUCTION

In this paper I focus attention on the cultural factor – a key dimension of the concept of the “other”\(^1\) that influences immigrants’ adaptation\(^2\) to the receiving society. The significance of culture in migratory research has grown along with the globalisation of migration, which, among others, has resulted in the cohabitation of the bearers of distant cultures within a single state. The magnitude of the phenomenon has not only invalidated the traditional assimilation model\(^3\) of coexistence but also the integration one. The integration model implies the preservation by newcomers of their already possessed cultural characteristics, combined with the absorption of the constituent elements of the host culture. Put to the empirical test this model has been proven wrong, since the immigrants do not seem to be interested in the absorption the constituent (or any) elements of the hosts’ culture, instead many of them rather oppose or even reject it and establish their own cultural milieu composed by religious, linguistic and other cultural characteristics.

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\(^1\) This is one of the basic categories in social sciences, above all in sociology, social anthropology, history and psychology, and – according to Alfred Schutz – this is also a universal category of human perception.

\(^2\) By “adaptation” I understand the individual and group responses to new and foreign socio-cultural environments, which may appear in the form of strategies or patterned behaviour deployed by the newcomers in the host society.

\(^3\) The assimilation model implies that immigrants, at least in the second generation, would be absorbed into the receiving society and become indistinguishable from it in cultural terms.
Recent immigration into Europe certainly calls for a new analytical approach which would highlight the role and importance of cultural factors in migration, rather neglected or minimized in debates so far, dominated by political, legal, economic, and demographic issues. This text aims at pursuing the importance of cultural factors in contemporary large scale inflows into the European Union.

THE WIDER CONTEXT

It seems that the direct incentive for labour migrants’ admission in Western European societies after the Second World War has been well explained in the following statement: the Swedish “substitution of immigrant populations for working-class ones was replicated in almost every European country” (Caldwell 2009: 124). However, the new and foreign working-class arrived from (very) distant cultures as well as other civilizations. And this is why the cultural issue of migration has gathered momentum.

Two processes closely related to each other and to the worldwide flows of the new working-class are the process of globalization and the development of transnational communities. The former has been facilitated by technology that has greatly eased and cheapened communication and transportation, and by the economic and political decisions that lie behind global flows of capital, goods, and people. All these factors resulted in the globalization of migrations, symbolized by “the era of migration” notion. With regard to the flows of people Saskia Sassen (1999: 7) observed almost two decades ago: “Today we can see in all highly developed countries a combination of drives to create border-free economic spaces and drives for renewed border controls to keep immigrants and refugees out”\(^4\). Recent large scale inflows into the EU have invalidated this opinion, however.

Another important, and already mentioned, factor related to these (global) movements is the establishment of transnational communities. By “transnationalism” I understand “the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Basch, Glick Schiller, Blanc-Szanton 1994: 6). Although the very existence or the novelty of transnationalism and transnational communities (spaces, fields) have been strongly debated – as well as their significance for migration studies – there is no doubt that contemporary immigrants factually “build social fields that cross

\(^4\) “Current immigration policy in developed countries is increasingly at odds with other major policy frameworks in the international system and with the growth of global economic integration” (Sassen 1999:7).
geographic, cultural, and political borders” (Basch, Glick Schiller, Blanc-Szanton 1994: 6)\(^5\). From our point of view it is of supreme importance that transnational communities “represent a distinct phenomenon at variance with traditional patterns of immigrant adaptation” (Portes 1997: 4). Unlike scholars (i.e. Thomas Faist) who believe that transnationalism and transnational communities would be the new and effective path to immigrants’ integration, I hold an opposite opinion – the multi-stranded social relations built by immigrants across borders pave the way to both: the growth of immigrant communities in countries of settlement and to the maintenance of their (ethnic) culture and identity despite their residence in the host society. The debated communities only augment the mobility of people driven, basically or amongst other reasons, by the lure of a better income and life (Romaniszyn 2007). Further, contemporary immigrants into the European Union formally classified as refugees are in fact hybrid migrants, in a sense that they are driven by partly political and partly economic incentives. Still, their economic motivations are specific for they basically look for higher income and level consumption and at the same time are not very interested, nor prepared, to take up jobs. And hence they cannot be labelled as labour migrants. Meanwhile, the constant ups and downs of the global and national economies make all work places, including the ones available to them, highly uncertain also in economically developed states. Still, these hybrid migrants strongly persist with their own way of life, defined by their conduct, purpose, values, and beliefs.

The arrival on a large scale of such hybrid immigrants from distant cultures and other civilizations poses a complex and real (practical) problem for the receiving states, and constitute a challenge for the migratory study. It may be that the cultural perspective presented in this text would be of some use in addressing both these issues or at least could make a good starting point for it.

CULTURE AND MIGRATION IN MIGRATORY RESEARCH

In migration studies the “cultural issue” has been generally addressed and presented in two ways: as a factor of socio-cultural change, and as multiculturalism that results from the encounters of cultures and their coexistence within one state. In the former case mass migrations have been perceived as a factor which triggers or accelerates socio-cultural change observed in all layers of culture – material, social and symbolic (Romaniszyn 2003, 2004, 2008). This process goes on either

\(^5\) This is so due to a number of entangled reasons: economic (globalization), political (immigration policies), technological (communication facilities).
through a diffusion of cultural elements and artefacts or the diffusion of culture, when the newcomers establish and maintain their own distinct, visible ethno-immigrant enclaves.

However, the debate on multiculturalism has raised culture to a central position in academic and political debates on migration. In one view immigrants and their foreign cultures “enrich” the receiving society. Indeed, also the recent hybrid immigrants into EU societies have been expected to “enrich” them. In the multicultural perspective the phrase “dominant group” particularly captures attention as it has been termed as depicting the host society as oppressive for the newcomers (actually the guests) named the “minority groups”\(^6\). This is a binary perspective which poses an opposition between the hosts and the guests represented as vulnerable victims of the former ones. In an opposite view immigrant communities are perceived “as a threat to the dominant culture and national identity” (Castles, Miller 1993: 33) due to their members’ unwillingness to integrate, underpinned by the retention of ethnic language and culture.

In yet another, only recently expressed view the nation, national culture and identity are highly questionable concepts without any empirical background. Perhaps on the level of rhetoric this announcement may well eradicate the problem of encounter, if not clash, of people from distant cultures and civilisations. However, the rhetorical annihilation of the nation and national culture may not prevent real and unavoidable, as I see it, confrontation between the host and the guest (newcomers) cultures and their bearers.

Apart from the already mentioned approaches, culture as a central theme has been taken up by numerous researchers. For instance, Donna Gabbaccia (1994: 129) studied the cultural differentiation among migrant women and observed that “cultural diversity among women had proved far more salient and persistent, both now and in the past, than economic and social structures would suggest.” The object of her research, Swedish and Irish domestic workers “resembled each other in their employment patterns, and in some of their marital and family choices, but they lived in linguistically, ethnically, and religiously separate communities, with little sense of commonality or shared sisterhood” (Gabbaccia 1994: 129). As seen, the cultural differences effectively separated women who originated from different cultural settings, and who otherwise shared the same socio-economic characteristics, having the same economic and social status and social prestige in the host country. Commenting further on these findings, and figuratively speaking, we may

\(^6\) I use terms the “guest” and the “host” or the “host society” for clear differentiation between those who have joined and those who have established a given socio-economic system (Romaniszyn 2008: 130f).
say that at least in the studied case, “the power of culture” undermined “the power of class” or that the cultural closeness undermined other ones. This correlation may well apply to and explain many other cases, including hybrid immigrants. The importance of culture in different incorporation trajectories characteristic for different ethnic groups has been also revealed in the longitudinal research of second generation Caribbean immigrants into the United States (Portes, Fernandez-Kelly and Haller 2005). Yet another study shows that besides legal, political, and socio-economic dimensions, culture and religion plays a significant role in the process of becoming an accepted part of society (Penninx 2007: 10).

As seen, culture is not a neutral element in spatial mobility. Moreover, culture determines migration in a number of ways, and this is the subject of the following section.

THE CULTURAL DETERMINANTS
OF MIGRATION AND ADAPTATION

Generally speaking, culture can either foster or hinder migratory movements, influencing their volume, direction, as well as the adaptation of newcomers. More precisely, there are cultural determinants of migration, and they need to be studied. In migratory research attention had always been paid to cultural determinants, named in various ways. In one such study conducted by James Fawcett (1989) the author puts forward a notion of “the non-people linkages” that either connect sending and receiving countries or work towards their disconnection. Within the category of these linkages, named the “mass culture connections”, Fawcett (1989: 675-667) identifies:

– the “international media diffusion (print, TV, film)” that “effectively conveys images and ideas about places across space to large audiences” and hence may “serve to make other places less foreign or strange”;

– the “norms governing out-migration and community acceptance of immigrants. Such norms can be very powerful in either constraining or facilitating migration flows. For example, extreme prejudice shown toward immigrants who are distinguished by skin colour or other visible characteristics will have feedback effects at the place of origin that are likely to diminish the migration flows”;

– the “compatibility of value systems” and “cultural similarity” meaning “the degree of similarity between cultures, the compatibility of value systems and commonalities in language and educational systems”.

What is enumerated above are in fact the cultural determinants of migration. Among them the notions of “cultural similarity” and “compatibility of value
systems” focus our attention on two essential cultural determinants of migration, namely language and values, which demand further investigation. Similarities or differences between the newcomers and the hosts in language and values, preserved and observed in customs and beliefs (religion) have their clear-cut consequences. Language similarity, while augmenting migratory flows and economic adaptation of migrants, does not necessarily help their social adaptation. An example is provided by the Irish immigrants in Great Britain and the USA at the turn of the XIX and XX centuries. While adapted well in the labour market they at the same time had been subjected to segregation in the host society, and generally looked down upon as very “rural people”.

With respect to the relation between language and migration close attention should also be paid to the newcomers’ (un)willingness to learn the language of the hosts. For instance, a general willingness of the Polish migrants in Greece to learn the Greek language – that has been highly praised by Greek employers, and generally by the Greeks – augmented and sped up their economic and social adaptation (Romaniszyn 1995). In this society immigrants are strongly encouraged to learn Greek, and when contrasting “them”, i.e. the immigrants, and “us” the Greek respondents focused, among others, on language as a strong marker of otherness (Triandafyllidou 2000:196). The lack of knowledge, interest and willingness to learn the recipient country’s language hinders or makes impossible economic and social adaptation. Reports on education from the receiving states, i.e. the Benelux countries, Germany, Canada, and others, confirm the correlation between the underachievement of pupils from ethnic-immigrant groups – which to a large extent depends on the fluency in the official language – and their later social and economic marginalization. It has also been observed that throughout Europe the lack of fluency in the receiving state’s official language makes for the underachievement of the immigrants’ offspring, and substantially decreases their chances on the labour market (Macura, Coleman 1994:56). The importance of the linguistic factor has also been revealed in a Spanish survey. The respondents expressed the opinion that integration would be problematic for the Africans and relatively easy for Latin Americans, due mostly to linguistic and cultural factors7 (King, Rodriges-Melguizo 1999:61).

Values represented in customs constitute another key factor that determines migratory flows and the adaptation of newcomers. Guests’ and hosts’ similarities or differences in customs understood as the habitual forms of behaviour or lifestyle may ease or hamper migratory flows, and the subsequent adaptation of the newcomers. The latter was the case of the Irish, the Polish, and the Italian

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7 However, the “cultural factors” were left unspecified by the authors.
immigrants in the USA and Canada in the 1920s, whose customs, or lifestyles, differed significantly from their White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant (WASP) hosts. For instance, the Polish peasant immigrants’ cuisine, their alleged smell of garlic, their clothes, particularly their sheepskin coats, had been viewed and judged by the WASP hosts as strange, curious, unrefined, and inferior to their own food and appearance (Romaniszyn 1991:18). This judgement, materialized in the negative stereotype, influenced the formal categorisation of these immigrants as unwanted, and hence enforced the decrease in their further inflows. However, eagerness to learn and adopt the lifestyle of the hosts hastens social and economic adaptation. Again an example is provided by the Polish migrants in Greece, praised for the quick absorption of the Greek way of enjoying life and spending free time (Romaniszyn 1995). Conversely, the unwillingness or difficulty in adopting to the hosts’ lifestyle(s) or customs, increases or fossilizes the distance between the guests and hosts and helps the development of distinct, ethnic enclaves, if not ghettos.

Values represented in religion or beliefs constitute a further cultural determinant in migratory movements. The same religion (beliefs) eases adaptation by building the feeling of closeness (sameness), while radical differences in this sphere obviously increase distance. For instance, Moroccans and other immigrants from the Maghreb region are usually perceived by their Spanish hosts as the most different group in terms of religion, language and race, and hence negatively stereotyped (King, Rodriges-Melguizo 1999: 63). Although when contrasting between “them”, i.e. immigrants, and “us”, the Greek respondents did not mention religion, it was because a large number of the immigrants were of the Christian faith, and the illegal status of most newcomers prevented them from expressing their religion publicly (Triandafyllidou 2000: 196). In the already cited example of the Irish, Polish, and Italian immigrants to the United States and Canada, their Catholicism considerably strengthened the perception of these newcomers as “essentially strange” holders of “patterns and moral ideals different from those maintained by the Anglo-Saxons” (Romaniszyn 1991:18), while Catholicism of the Polish contemporary migrants in Spain not only strengthens their positive representation, but also augments their socio-economic adaptation.

Symbolic culture, i.e. a system of values and norms also determines migration because it underpins the encounters and any relations between the newcomers and the hosts. Materialized in the state’s law, the symbolic culture is omni present. That is why the idea of a multiethnic state as a political community that grants

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8 Such a state is to be bounded by constitutional patriotism, based on a constitution and law, and citizenship is to be dissociated from nationality.
admission to all newcomers is in fact (only) the symbolic cultural product of the host society. And this product needs to be accepted by the newcomers who are also the bearers of their own symbolic culture. That is why the final result of this ideal materialization is very far from obvious. Firstly, it is because this cultural construction (political community) may be at odds with values and norms observed by newcomers. The constitution and law – the basis of political community – are the secular creations of liberal culture contested by the numerous, especially Muslim, newcomers. According to Jürgen Habermas (1984) if any mechanism of social integration exists at all, it is the rationalised legal system based on universalistic values such as freedom and equality, which ensures the inclusion of all actors independently of their specific cultural traditions. Firstly, the point is that freedom and equality, as liberal and secular culture defines them, may not be acceptable for some Muslim guests, especially but not only with regard to women. Secondly, the community in question necessitates civic education or indoctrination that may be perceived as alien, oppressive and incompatible with the newcomers’ values, norms and ideas. Thirdly, the newcomers need to be interested in, and need to comply with the established political rules that also are not value free. On the whole, the liberal and secular values underpinning the discussed political entity may well be unacceptable for immigrants, Muslim ones in particular. The already apparent clash between followers of Islam and the secular liberal culture of European states reveals how powerful and important the symbolic culture determinant is in migration.

THE “OTHER”

The discussion carried on so far has led us to the paper’s central concept and issue of the “other”. The “other” issue, raised, examined and debated in the social sciences, and in sociology in particular has appeared in works of such prominent authors as: Georg Simmel, William G. Sumner, Robert Park, Emory Bogardus, Robert Merton, Alfred Schütz, and in Polish sociology Florian Znaniecki, Jan Bystroń, Stanislaw Ossowski, Józef Obrębski. Recently the “other” issue is most often used in an ideologically biased debate on exclusion and discrimination, when the latter terms (notions) are usually left undefined. As a rule, the “other” notion is adopted in the discussion on relations between immigrants (newcomers) and hosts (depicted as the dominant group), more precisely on the alleged construction of the newcomer as the “other”. “Construction of the >other< or

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9 For more see: E. Nowicka (1990: 7-14).
>stranger< may be based on various grounds: on legal status (foreigner); on physical appearance (race); on (perceived) cultural and religious differences, on class characteristics or on any combination of these elements” (Penninx 2007: 9). As seen, the “other” understood in a presented way is a victim of the dominant group (the hosts). Such “victimized” uses overlook the very fact that the “other” concept refers to various dimensions (aspects) of any encounter, although in particular it refers to encounters with bearers of different cultures (and morality). Meanwhile the “other” issue arises when the culture of both or just one side of the encounter is chronically introverted. Such “cultural otherness”, so to speak, has been well depicted by Georg Simmel (1975) in his essay on the “stranger”. He viewed the “stranger” as a person who is physically close, but culturally distant. Hence, strangers are “cultural others” among us, and this is because their culture is chronically introverted and they maintain it as such. On the one hand, “strangers” are perceived as culturally different, and on the other hand, they perceive themselves as different and persist on maintaining their distinguishing and distinguishable culture and cultural traits. Thus, these persons can be described as “strangers at their own request” (Romaniszyn 2004:147). They restrain themselves from belonging to the immediately surrounding community other than their own, as well as from belonging to the larger host society. A clear indicator of the “stranger’s” refraining from belonging to the host society is low (or any) interest in learning the country’s official language. Needless to say, the permanent residence of such “strangers” and the establishment of their local communities paves the way for the formation of we-group and other-group – to use William G. Sumner’s notion (1995[1906]) – whose relations, according to the author, are defined by constant confrontation that can take on various forms, including violence. The “cultural strangers”, notwithstanding the long-term residence, do not aspire to assimilate or integrate with the host society, being independent from its culture, its core values and norms, including the symbolic culture. People are “cultural strangers” not because they are perceived as such, but because they really are culturally different, praise that as an asset and do not intend to change.

Against this background we may look into encounters with Muslim immigrants to the EU as “whenever Europeans worried about the long-term assimilability of immigrants, it was Muslims they worried about most” (Caldwell 2009: 154).
ENCOUNTERS WITH THE MUSLIM NEWCOMERS

In the years 2010-2016 over 6 million Muslim immigrants arrived in Europe. They are not economic migrants, since unlike labour migrants “these new immigrants who come as relatives and refugees aren’t coming to do, they’re coming to be” (Caldwell 2009: 81). In 1968 Enoch Powell, a British politician, predicted that until 2002 the non-White population of Great Britain would rise to 4.5 million, and indeed the 2002 census showed the population of ethnic minorities in this country reaching 4,635,296 people. He was also right in arguing that integration was not the aim of the majority of immigrants. This argument, unacceptable at his time (and perhaps in our time too), has been recently proven correct. Moreover, large scale inflows into EU Member States continues, and in the foreseeable future Europe should expect further mass movement from the Middle and the Far East, as well as from Africa. In the latter case Europe’s border statistics show a well-travelled route of migrants from Africa to Europe. Behind the widespread appeal of emigrating from the African continent lay two basic factors entangled with one another and related to economic well-being and insecurity. Namely, high unemployment combined with relatively low wages and political instability. They both explain a general willingness to migrate from Africa to either EU states, Norway and Switzerland or to the USA where communities of African immigrants have already been established. The emergent transnational space built by the social networks of these immigrants and not-yet-immigrants from African countries, who constantly and regularly maintain contacts, directs and boosts these migratory currents and results in constant growth of the immigrant population in the receiving countries, named above. A vital part of this transnational space, which augments the mentioned as well as other migration flows into EU Member States, undoubtedly constitutes a very well developed and still developing “mi-

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10 I adhere to opinion that “while diversity certainly exists among Muslim groups, its importance has been overstated” (Caldwell 2009: 155).
12 The number will grow also due to the family reunification regime; for instance, from summer 2018 immigrants already residing in Germany (some 400 thousand and many of them Muslims) would be allowed to invite their family from the home country.
14 Just one example: “about 420,000 more sub-Saharan African migrants lived in Europe in 2017 (4.15 million) than in 2010 (3.73 million). And an estimated 1.55 million sub-Saharan African migrants lived in the U.S in 2017, an increase of about a 325,000 from 2010, when an estimated 1.22 million sub-Saharan African migrants lived in the country, according to the United Nations”, At least a Million Sub-Saharan Africans Moved, op. cit., p. 2.
migration industry”, which concentrates on smuggling people from the Middle and Far East, and hence promotes that trade.

Over the last decades the mass inflows into receiving European countries have already led to the formation of ethnic neighbourhoods (sometimes districts) – located in the majority of metropolises and also in small towns – and populated by immigrants who preserve their own culture\textsuperscript{15}. Many of them are Muslim immigrants’ neighbourhoods. Their specificity with regard to posters, music, smells, ethnic schools, mosques, shops, etc., make a visible and direct impact on the local landscape. While reshaping the landscapes of the cities, the ethno-immigrant neighbourhoods establish or enhance and express the boundaries between immigrants and their hosts (Romaniszyn 2004: 146). It is because the ethnic neighbourhoods “are thought before they are build” (Rapoport 2000: 472)\textsuperscript{16}, and landscapes “are culture before they are nature” (Shama 1995: 61). These neighbourhoods necessitate the accommodation – both physical and cognitive – on the part of the local indigenous inhabitants. And this accommodation involves – at least partial – accommodation to them. The constant presence of the newcomers from distant cultures (incarnated in the landscape), who praise and preserve their cultural ( ethic) identity pose a challenge to the collective identity of the hosts. This happens because these newcomers “directly alter the ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic composition of the population” (Guerra 1997: 16). It is one reason for a growing concern over the “national issue” and national culture in European receiving societies. Conversely, this fosters ethnic identity, as “the national or ethnic identity of each side of the encounter develops in relation to the other” (Romaniszyn 2008: 130). From that it follows that the ethno-immigrant neighbourhoods augment and foster their inhabitants’ ethnic culture and identity or in other words their “cultural otherness”. Indeed, the ethno-immigrant neighbourhoods provide important insights into the “cultural otherness” issue, part of which is their inhabitants’ identity.

The establishment and persistence of ethno-immigrant neighbourhoods hint at a specific identity that may develop among their inhabitants and may be named the “stranger identity”. This is the identity of people who do not aspire to assimilate despite long-term residence in the host society, who do not know nor observe the

\textsuperscript{15} Empirical evidence of such ethno-immigrant neighbourhoods can be easily obtained from numerous publications.

\textsuperscript{16} “Any considerations of built environment must take into account not only the ‘hardware’ but also the people, their activities, wants, needs, values, life-styles and other aspects of culture”; Rapoport 2000: 461.
local customs and who implement cultural traits\(^{17}\) (qualities) into the local community and landscape which are derived from the outside. This is the identity of the strangers at their own request or of the culturally others. In Levine’s words (1979: 30) such persons desire residence in the host society “without becoming assimilated into it”, they “desire” to be in the group but not of it. Such “requested”, preserved and constant strangeness of immigrants speeds up the transformation of the neighbourhoods they inhabit into ethnic enclaves or ghettos. Its members reside but do not integrate with the host society and consequently they exhibit low or no interest in learning the host society language and culture\(^{18}\). Living in their own cultural milieu different from the host culture they not just remain “as they are” but rather further develop their “stranger identity”, understood as an asset and built in a deliberate opposition to the hosts’ culture. Moreover, some of the Muslim immigrants in the EU have been strongly encouraged by their home country elite and politicians to maintain their national identity\(^{19}\).

A prominent example of the discussed issue is provided by the phenomenon of the re-Islamization of European Muslim youth (Roy 2000; Mandaville 1999). These young people rediscover the religion of their ancestors, oppose it to Western democracy and liberal culture, and deliberately construct their identity vis-à-vis this culture. “It was not just that young Muslims were assimilating too slowly into European culture as the generations passed. It was that they were dis-assimilating” (Caldwell 2009: 133). The ethno-immigrant enclaves they inhabit augment this process, for they “are not merely containers for culture, but are used actively by people in the contexts of cultural processes” (Rapoport 2000: 496). Still, due to unprecedented development of communication facilities, “ancestral cultures are now, for the first time in the history of transcontinental migration, generally available for all immigrants and their descendants to fall back on” (Caldwell 2009: 133-134). And this is how transnational spaces work. Moreover and more importantly, while assuming their stranger identity, Muslims, not only the Muslim youth, blur the distinction between the religious and the secular, which collides with the principle of liberal culture of their hosts. Hence, the (rhetorical) question arises whether and when they would engage in any debates on the values fundamental for them and those fundamental for the host culture? And this brings us to the issue of the development of a parallel Muslim society.

\(^{17}\) In social anthropology cultural traits are understood as cultural elements which may be both material and non-material.

\(^{18}\) Also, social welfare granted to Muslims does not help to achieve their integration with the host society and some Muslim radicals view it as a tax from infidels.

\(^{19}\) One such prominent example is provided by the president of Turkey who argued that assimilation of Turkish immigrants and their denying of Turkish identity would be a crime.
“The sense that the Muslim part of Europe’s immigrant population was shearing off and formed a parallel society has been at the heart of European worries about Islam since well before September 11, 2001” (Caldwell 2009:121). These developments would mean that Muslim neighbourhoods and enclaves have already changed into a parallel Muslim society. But what are the evidences of such a society? First of all, in the European host states the Muslim culture has already crossed the threshold of the Muslim neighbourhoods or enclaves and has begun to penetrate the public spaces of these states. To visible and undisputable evidences of such expansion belong: special prayer places reserved for Muslims and located in public offices, special hours in public swimming pools reserved for Muslim users, proliferation of mosques in European town and cities, and so on. Besides, due to demographic factors, in some small towns Muslims form the definite majority, and hence reshape the landscape along with their cultural preferences, while in some metropolises and smaller towns Muslim voters have already entered the political sphere, influencing the results of local elections. All these indicate the “other” culture’s expansion and its installation or accommodation within the system. But this does not mean the “other” culture, i.e. the Muslim culture and law, form a part of the system. Admittedly, Angela Merkel declared in Bundestag in January 2015 that “Islam belongs to Germany”20, however, the Muslim have never declared that liberal culture and its values nor Christianity belong to Islam. And this is the point. Although “Islam is a magnificent religion that has also been, at times over the centuries, a glorious and generous culture”, but truly “it is in no sense Europe’s religion and it is in no sense Europe’s culture” (Caldwell 2009: 349).

Another indicator of the development of the Muslim parallel society is the very activation of various Muslim organizations, and the character of claims they make. For instance, an influential organization named the Islamic Foundation propagates the thesis that Muslims are to change the British society in compliance with their faith (Phillips 2010: 156). And the Islamic Sharia Council, as well as a cohort of British Muslims, opt for either the implementation of Islamic law in this society21 or, at least, the implementation of a parallel cultural and legal system for Muslims. The Association of Muslim Lawyers has come out with an official demand to acknowledge the Muslim right to have four wives; by the way its refusal is not easy, and protests against polygamy are not very convincing, all in a society which accepts cohabitations and swift changes of partners (Phillips

20 The statement, however, settled controversy, i.e. Erika Steinbach publicly said that it is untrue since Islam does not belong to German tradition (Doleśniak-Harczuk 2017: 71).

21 It is quite possible that one Leipzig Imam’s opinion that the Muslims in Germany will observe the German law only as long as they are a minority in this country (Doleńskiak-Harczuk 2017:72) is shared by others and spread out not only in Germany.
2010: 170-172). As the Institute for the Study of Islam and Christianity puts it these organizations aim at the foundation of an Islamic space in Great Britain or at the creation of a “state within the state” (Phillips 2010: 170-171). Importantly these claims have been put forward by the politicised and radical Islam that aims at global religious and political conquest\(^2\), as one of their banner reads: “Islam is the perfect system for all mankind”.

And most importantly, a parallel society develops against the background of Islamic religious revival. “For decades European Muslims, like virtually every other people in the world except European Christians, have been gravitating (back) towards religion” (Caldwell 2009: 176). As a result, nowadays “in most Muslim communities in Europe – rich or poor, fresh off the plane or two generations from the dock – the importance and prestige of Islam are on the rise” (Caldwell 2009: 175). And the clue of this religious revival is that “the return of Islam is not just the resurgence of a doctrine but the resurgence of a people” (Caldwell 2009: 177). And precisely these people maintain that Muslims and Islam will be the (near) future of Europe; actually it is already the first religion in Brussels.

The religious revival, as the background of the Muslim parallel society, has been matched with secularisation, as well as the social decay of European societies. In Europe “the native society views its distance from religion not as a loss but as a cultural attainment. It proclaims its post-religious universalism more loudly, haughtily, snobbishly”, and “many have come to see religious scepticism as part of the essences of European-ness”, so that “a good definition of religion for most modern Europeans might be ’an irrational opinion, strongly held’” (Caldwell 2009: 181-182)\(^3\). In such a social milieu it is Islam that provides “an alternative source of values that appeared, to many European immigrants, more legitimate, more coherent, and more alive than Europe’s discredited national cultures” (Caldwell 2009: 107). Incidentally, European national cultures have been discredited with our efficient and generous help, what Roger Scruton (2003: 69-82) depicted as an attitude of “do away with ourselves”. Undoubtedly, the loss of Christian faith by Europeans plays a decisive part in questioning or rejection their national cultures by newcomers. The very fact that “today, one of the major topics if interreligious dialogue concerns the protocols for the purchase of churches by Muslim groups, who then reconsecrate them as mosques” (Caldwell 2009: 179) is a prominent indicator of this loss and its consequences.

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\(^2\) As stated in the “Muslim World Today” (Phillips 2010: 299). In the U.K. the radicalisation of Islam took place in the 1980s and 1990s, triggered by the war in Afghanistan, revolution in Iran, war in Bosnia (Phillips 2010: 49-53).

\(^3\) On the other hand, close “proximity to Islam spurs religiosity among non-Muslims” in Europe (Caldwell 2009: 184).
Among the numerous and diagnosed symptoms of social decay which thrive in Western liberal democracies are: drug addiction, pornography, and breakdown of family life. On the one hand, they pave the way for a rejection of secular and liberal culture, while on the other they orient society towards firm norms or moral pillars. The latter are not easily obtained in secularised, post-Christian societies. Certainly, “before immigrants could live by European rules, Europeans had to figure out what those rules were” (Caldwell 2009: 107). There is also no wonder that “the children of immigrants did not always find European culture – with its atomization, its consumerism, its sexual wantonness – self-evidently superior to their parents’ cultures” (Caldwell 2009: 133). Last but not least, and quite paradoxically, “the West’s new, ‘loose’ sexual morality […] may fit traditional Muslim thinking better that it fits traditional Western thinking”, thus “traditional Islam is only partially at odds with present-day sexual practice, not totally at odds the way Christianity is” (Caldwell 2009: 243). This is why and how the Islamic religious revival, on the one hand, and the Christian, say, inactivation if not apostasy on the other hand establish a solid foundation for the smooth and steady development of the Muslim parallel society within the Western secular and liberal democracies.

Finally, the Muslim parallel society is composed of flourishing and close-knit communities. Muslim cultural centres and mosques built in places of Muslim concentrations demonstrate the strength and vigour of these communities, while the Judeo-Christian civilization is nearing an imminent death and the emptying of churches proceeds at a terrific speed (Magierowski 2009: 8). The same pertains to the indigenous European local communities. As Christopher Caldwell (2009: 349) observes: “Europe’s basic problem with Islam, and with immigration more generally, is that the strongest communities in Europe are, culturally speaking, not European communities at all”. Still, these are Muslim, not other communities arising from immigration that build up the parallel society (Caldwell 2009: 132). Displayed developments steadily jeopardize the relationship with the hosts, who worry about the evolution of Muslim communities into “ethnic colonies” and perceive further mass immigration into Europe “more like a colonization than an immigration” (Caldwell 2009: 147). In yet another opinion, the evolution from Muslim neighbourhoods to Muslim communities and the parallel society stands for the Islamization from the bottom up.

The already depicted evolution of the Muslim neighbourhoods reveals the importance and the consequences of immigrants’ cultural otherness, deliberately preserved, when matched with the crumbling of the receiving society. In light of the presented discussion the issue of “reverse integration”, i.e. integration of the hosts to the Muslim culture and, steadily growing, the society within Western European
countries is of the most importance. One may already indicate factual evidence of reverse integration, like the ever-growing number of converts to Islam, and the actual acceptance of newcomers’ polygamy. But contrary to “reverse integration”, the density of encounters and interactions between the hosts and the newcomers have also led to a steady decline in public sympathies towards the latter, and to a rise in xenophobic tendencies and racist ideas, attitudes and acts (Romaniszyn 2004: 149), as the available data and almost everyday news indicate. Clearly, the encounters with Muslim immigrants, and later on residents, poses a real challenge and compels the followers of the liberal culture to rethink it vis-à-vis the principles and values brought in by immigrants who had chosen to remain the “cultural other”. First of all the question arises whether the liberal creed is capable of tackling pressures from (fundamental) Islam, which openly oppose it, and whose followers persist with their own worldview, ways of life, and conduct. The elevation of liberal culture to the status of culture core – in the secularised post-Christian democracies which “have lost confidence in the values of their own societies, the worth of their own nation or the truths of their own religion” (Coleman 1994: 43) – and the subsequent removal of religion from the public sphere and life makes the accommodation of religious communities and their demands a particularly serious dilemma (Romaniszyn 2004: 150). Even more, “for the first time in centuries, Europeans are living in a world they did not, for the most part, shape” and “for the first time in modern history, European societies were taking pains to allow residents – and increasingly, citizens – to lead their entire lives in a foreign culture” (Caldwell 2009: 328, 166). The encounters with the “cultural other”, and morally the strongest one as it is, turned out to be a confrontation that has already changed European receiving countries, and triggered further socio-cultural changes. In the sense of vigour and moral strength, Europeans seem to be the weaker side of that confrontation. Christopher Caldwell (2009: 349) does not hesitate to state that “Islam is the stronger party in that contest, in an obvious demographic way, and in a less obvious philosophical way. In such circumstances, words like ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ mean little.”

In sum, the results – so far – of the encounters with immigrants, Muslim ones in particular, clearly show that newcomers are not invented others but factual ones, who have the right and will to maintain, cultivate and build up their cultural otherness vis-à-vis the host society. Hence, they are not to adapt to the latter. Does

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24 By the way, “if Europe is getting more immigrants than its voters want, this is a good indication that its democracy is malfunctioning” (Caldwell 2009: 330).

25 As Christopher Caldwell (2009: 342) put it “Mass immigration into Europe and the consolidation of Islam there are changing European life permanently”.
it mean then that the hosts are to adapt, day-by-day, to them, or otherwise to face the approaching confrontation(s)?

BRIEF NOTES ON THE MIGRATION DISCOURSES

The idea, and hope, of newcomers’ integration to the liberal culture of the receiving Western societies has been negatively verified in social practice. As all attempts to integrate immigrants have failed, and thus seem to be abandoned, a handful of new expressions and notions have been coined into the public discourse with regard to the inflows. In the new rhetoric the newcomers “enrich” the hosts who are to “get used” to the newcomers’ conduct and way of life, i.e. they are to “get used” to (forced) intermingling with people representing diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds, and above all the large scale immigration into the EU is allegedly “an inevitable result of globalization.” Commenting the “enrichment” and the “get used” arguments one may say that both the “enrichment” and “getting used” open the way to reverse integration. The “inevitability” of the inflows due to globalization reminds us about vocabulary used almost three decades ago with regard to expected (mass) immigration from Central and Eastern Europe to the EU, which was perceived, feared and named as a “great threat”. Interestingly, this was so despite relatively minor cultural differences between Western, Central and Eastern Europeans. And later on, at the eve of the EU enlargement in 2004, the notion of Europeanization was invented and put forward. Somehow today both notions, i.e. the (great) threat and Europeanization, have disappeared from the discourses on mass inflows into the EU, although immigrants come form distant cultures and other civilizations. Does it mean that the Eastern European needed or deserved Europeanization in contrast to the recent newcomers? Or does it mean that Europeanization is no longer valid or has gone into retreat and gives way to the “enrichment” of Europe by the latest newcomers, which means its de-Europeanization?

In contemporary academic discourses the proponents of “the immigrant as the non-invented-other” concept, already presented, may well face a barrage of criticism, including an accusation of racism. Incidentally, this would deny the newcomers the right to become other and thus, this may well be qualified as inverted racism or racism a rebours. Such accusations are on par with the criminalization of opinion – to use Christopher Caldwell’s (2009: 89) notion – that on occasion

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26 The more so as the definition of racism “that is was whatever anyone said it was – became the working norm in many European countries”, hence, a racist incident may be defined as “any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person”; see: Caldwell 2009: 89.
surfaces also in academic debate. In public debates “the terms fascist, xenophobe, extremist, and radical are applied promiscuously to a wide range of anti-immigrant parties and tendencies, most of which are democratic” (Caldwell 2009: 312). In academia the newly coined expression “we are all migrants” in fact blurs the distinction between the hosts and the guests. Moreover, it de facto annihilates the territoriality of cultures, including ethnic and national cultures, as well as the very idea of homeland. Along with the “we are all migrants” expression goes another one, i.e. “mobility is natural” or “mobility is a (basic) necessity”. Their proponents seem to overlook the fact that European culture, so verbally praised, has emerged and existed on, and has been rooted in a particular territory. Constant mobility of Europeans, and any bearers of culture threatens the very existence of this culture, and constant mobility makes people from nowhere. Luckily, Europeans have not been so far driven by the alleged imperative of mobility.

Commenting on the evolution of academic vocabulary regarding mobility one may notice that national culture and national identity have their enemies in this, as well as in political, milieus. In the year 2000 the Runnymede Trust published a report questioning the notions of “national identity” and “national culture”, holding that the nation is an artificial creation (Phillips 2010: 121). Only recently this existence had been openly denied by French and Swedish politicians who publicly announced the non-existence of respectively French and Swedish culture. It should be underlined, however, that this alters the sense of the “enrichment” rhetoric, as non-existence of national culture equals with non-existence of the matter of enrichment. All this proves Frances Fukuyama’s observation that the post-modern European elites no longer identify themselves in terms of nationality and faith.

The observed evolution of rhetoric in academia and the public sphere on migrant inflows and national identity cannot itself eradicate the problems resulting from (risky) encounters of the bearers of different and distant cultures within one nation state, at least in Europe. The nirvana of multiculturalism has come to its end (Phillips 2010: 304). And what shall the next one be? Would it be the ideal of Europe without national cultures and nation states? Would it be the idea (and appeal) of the adaptation to the culturally ‘others’ by Europeans who have lost their identity and confidence in their faith, values, and culture (Coleman), replaced by an attitude of self-hatred (Scruton)?

Finally, out of the presented discussion a disturbing question arises whether the verbal annihilation of (European) nations and national cultures, and the “we are all migrants” pedagogy along with large scale inflows from outside Europe aim at the deprivation of the right to territory? If so, it needs to be clarified whether the newcomers are also to be deprived of this right? And who will profit from it?
CONCLUSIONS

In light of the presented discussion, the cultural determinants of migration and adaptation cannot be considered incidental, insignificant or invalid. While cultural similarities truly play the role of “cultural links” bridging countries and people and fostering other links i.e. economic and political ones, cultural differences, and among them the “cultural otherness”, make the establishment and maintenance of such links impossible. Currently, when the South builds up ever increasing migration pressures on the North, and the North-South divide is formed by fundamental cultural differences – pointed out by Samuel Huntington – the crucial importance of their examination in migration research demands no proof. There are precisely cultural differences that lay behind all three enumerated dimensions of integration, that according to the definition “covers at least three analytically distinct dimensions of becoming an accepted part of society: the legal/political, the socio-economic and the cultural/religious one” (Penninx 2007: 10). It is so because symbolic culture (values and norms) underpins or is embedded in: the legislation, political system and all a state’s policies, as well as social and economic institutions. Nonetheless, it needs to be underlined that this and other definitions of integration as a rule underscore just one side of the process, i.e. the side of the guests (the newcomers) who may either be accepted or not by the hosts due to their factual or alleged distinctiveness. The other side of the integration process, however, is the acceptance or not of the hosts’ culture by the newcomers. For instance, what if followers of Islam, accepted as a part of the German society, do not accept its secular and liberal culture? And what in the long run will be the end result of the legal/political and socio/economic acceptance of such immigrants? Certainly, we are not able to escape from these questions, and problems, neither in the social sciences nor in practice. Indeed, the reverse and mostly overlooked side of the integration coin is the will of the newcomers to integrate, which relies not just on good or ill will of people but on cultural closeness or the lack of it.

Just to conclude, the analysis carried out made clear that:

– the two legal systems, i.e. Sharia and that of liberal democracies are not compatible in any sense, in fact they oppose each other totally, thus they cannot be incorporated in one, even hybrid, legal system;

– from this it follows that the cultural otherness of the followers of Islam is factual, not invented nor imputed to the Muslim immigrants and residents by the hosts (or the “dominant” group);

– next, the religious revival identified as re-Islamization proves that these immigrants and residents do not integrate with respect to culture (and worldview), and do not intend to do so;
– the establishment and growth of Muslim communities (or parallel societies),
vigorous in a demographic and religious (cultural) sense, puts an end to hopes
of their members’ secularization, i.e. Westernization or Europeanization in the
foreseeable future.

Out of the facts enumerated above the rhetorical question arises: what in
the long run would be the basis for coexistence within one nation state of these
non-invented-cultural-others and secularised Europeans worshiping their liberal
virtues, who – on their part – are perceived as culturally other by Muslims? In
a word, how can fundamental cultural otherness coexist within one nation state?
We may come forward with one answer: such a coexistence is impossible, and
works towards the end of the nation state in Europe, desired by some. Hence, it
may be that the admission – on a large scale – of the cultural others into the EU
is just a very well calculated step to the end of European nation states and to the
creation of a new socio-political reality within the realm of the EU.

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IMIGRANT JAKO NIEWYIMAGINOWANY „INNY”

Streszczenie

Artykuł poświęcony jest omówieniu kwestii adaptacji w kraju przyjmującym imigrantów pochodzących z odległych kultur. W szczególności jego celem jest analiza kulturowych determinant adaptacji, przy uwzględnieniu kluczowej dla tego wymiaru badań koncepcji „innego” („obcego”). Szerszy kontekst prowadzonej analizy stanowią studia poświęcone kulturowym determinantom migracji i adaptacji. Sama zaś analiza skupia się na problemach związanych z migracją Muzułmanów do krajów Unii Europejskiej. Artykuł wieńczy przegląd głównych stanowisk w debacie o migracji.

Słowa kluczowe: migranci; „inny”; „obcy”; adaptacja; islamscy przybysze

THE IMMIGRANT AS A NOT-INVENTED “OTHER”

Summary

The paper aims at discussing the problem of adaptation of newcomers who originate from distant cultures. In particular it aims at examining the cultural factor – a key dimension of the concept of the “other” that influence immigrants adaptation to the receiving society. The discussion enters into the wider phenomenon of the cultural determinants of migration and adaptation. It focuses on the encounters with the Muslim immigrants into the European Union states. The paper ends with brief notes on the migration discourses.

Key words: migrants; the “other”; adaptation; the Muslim newcomers